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Abstract 
The purpose of this work is primarily to defend the Thomistic approach to well-being on 
three fronts. First, it is often said that objective theories of well-being are vulnerable to the 
objection that, if well-being is objective, someone’s good might not sufficiently resonate with 
him or her. That is, objectivist theories suffer because they fail to meet the “internalist” 
constraint. I argue, however, that a Thomistic theory of well-being—objective though it is—is 
not vulnerable to this criticism. Second, it has been argued that perfectionist theories of well-
being (like Aquinas’) cannot accommodate the intuition that pleasure and “cheap thrills” 
positively contribute to human well-being. I argue that a Thomistic theory of well-being can 
indeed affirm the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and “cheap thrills.” Finally, I argue—against the 
objections of other scholars—that a singular analysis of relational goodness (i.e. x is good for y) 
is possible. This singular analysis is grounded in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and, I 
believe, can helpfully inform our discussions about human well-being.  
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Paper 1: Subjectivism, Internalism, and Thomistic Theories of Value 
I. Introduction 
Welfare internalism holds that “for any intrinsic good φ for a person p, it must be the case 
that φ ‘fits’ p, resonates with p, fails to alienate p, and so forth.”1 While philosophers vary on how 
to best characterize the relationship between a person and his good, the motivation behind welfare 
internalism is widely shared: a person’s good should not be alien to him.2 Rather, the internalist 
claims, there must be some link between a person’s evaluative perspective—whether that be 
cashed out in terms of desires, values, motivations, judgments, or pro-attitudes—and his good. 
Philosophers who defend subjectivist theories of well-being often cite welfare 
internalism’s intuitive appeal as a reason for the plausibility of subjectivism. A commitment to 
welfare internalism is, as one philosopher puts it, at the “heart of subjectivism.”3 It is easy to see 
why welfare subjectivism and welfare internalism tend to go hand-in-hand. Subjectivist theories 
of well-being hold that a person’s values, desires, or pro-attitudes determine what is good for 
him.4 When intrinsic goodness is a product of one’s values, desires, judgments, or pro-attitudes, 
                                                 
 
1 Dale Dorsey, "Idealization and the Heart of Subjectivism," Noûs 51, no. 1 (2017). 
2 Connie S. Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 
105, no. 2 (1995); Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," in Facts, Values and Norms (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47. 
3 Dorsey, "Idealization and the Heart of Subjectivism," 200. 
4 See, e.g. David Sobel, From Valuing to Value : A Defense of Subjectivism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 261. 
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a link between those values, desires, judgements, or pro-attitudes and one’s good is clearly 
present.5 
In this paper, I will argue that the truth of welfare internalism—a premise I here leave 
unquestioned—does not suggest that well-being is in fact subjective.6 Other philosophers have, 
of course, acknowledged potential consistency between objective theories of well-being and 
welfare internalism.7 But objectivist philosophers rarely attempt to incorporate welfare 
internalism into their welfare theories; they often either dismiss welfare internalism or pass over 
its possible compatibility with objectivism rather quickly.8 Greater care should be given by 
objectivist philosophers to explain how objectivist theories might satisfy welfare internalism. 
Insofar as many philosophers take welfare internalism to be “deeply plausible,” an objectivist 
theory suffers insofar as its compatibility with internalism is not articulated. At the same time, 
objectivist theories of well-being can avoid certain problems that subjectivist theories often 
encounter. As such, I find great appeal in a welfare theory that can plausibly blend the virtues of 
                                                 
 
5 Dale Dorsey, "Why Should Welfare 'Fit'?," Philos. Q. 67, no. 269 (2017). This is not to say that 
a welfare theory will necessarily identify the correct link between the agent’s values, desire, 
judgments, or pro-attitudes and his good.  
6 Cf. Andrew Sarch, "Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It," Philosophical 
Studies 154, no. 2 (2011). 
7 David Brink, "The Significance of Desire," in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 3, ed. Russ 
Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 6; Dorsey, "Why Should Welfare 'Fit'?." 
8 Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 18; Philippa Foot, 
Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23-24. Robert Merrihew Adams, 
Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
25-26. However, David Brink and Mark Murphy have developed objectivist lines of reasoning 
which, like the theory I offer in this paper, incorporate a version of internalism. See Mark C. 
Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
81; Brink, "The Significance of Desire." 
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objectivism with the intuitive appeal of welfare internalism. One such theory—the one I find 
most compelling—is the welfare theory found in the work of Thomas Aquinas. 
A brief road map. First, I will lay out a general framework for understanding welfare 
internalism, especially within the context of subjectivist theories of well-being. For the purposes 
of this paper, I accept the premise that internalism is compatible with a less-than-direct link 
between an agent and his good; all that matters is that an agent would take the right evaluative 
attitude towards his good in the right circumstances.  I will then show how the Thomistic theory 
of welfare can fit into this framework, and that it does not run the risk of alienating an agent from 
his good any more than does the average subjectivist theory. I then clarify a few points that 
might draw objections. Finally, I argue that, at least in one respect, welfare objectivism avoids a 
serious problem faced by welfare subjectivism; in fact, it might be the case that welfare 
objectivism—at least of the Thomistic variety—is less alienating than most subjectivist theories.  
II. The Good-Value Link and Theories of Value 
Dale Dorsey argues that there are two key “building blocks” of welfare subjectivism. The 
first building block is the good-value link:  
Good-Value Link: for any object, event, state, etc., φ and agent x, φ is good for x only if φ 
is valued, under conditions c, by x.9 
The good-value link is Dorsey’s formulation of welfare internalism. While not all philosophers 
characterize internalism in terms of value, Dorsey’s approach is intended to accommodate a 
broad range of internalist and subjectivist theories. After all, philosophers might disagree about 
                                                 
 
9 Dorsey, "Idealization and the Heart of Subjectivism."  
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what it means to value something. Thus the second building block of subjectivism (or rather, any 
welfare theory that accepts the good-value link):  
Theory of Value: for any object, event, state, etc., φ and agent x, x values φ insofar as x 
takes relation r towards φ under conditions c.   
 
The number of variables within these two building blocks allows for a wide variety of 
subjectivist welfare theories—some more (or less) plausible than others.  
 The simplest form of subjectivism (given these building blocks) is one that characterizes 
conditions c as the actually-existing conditions in which an agent finds himself. For example, in 
a simple desiderative theory (i.e. one in which relation-r is desire), an agent’s actual, present 
desires constitute his actual, present values. Thus, only those things that he actually, presently 
desires can be good for him. This view is simple and straightforward. It also superficially retains 
an agent’s autonomy over his good—a feature of welfare theories that subjectivists find 
appealing. However, a brief reflection demonstrates that this simple form of subjectivism is not 
very plausible.10 One might desire to (due to ignorance) drink from a polluted river; one might 
irrationally desire to avoid the dentist; one might have deviant sexual desires—yet most 
philosophers would reject a welfare theory that counts satisfying these desires as good.11 
  To understand how philosophers often address this issue, it may be worth briefly 
discussing different kinds of value. As rational agents, we value certain things. But the things we 
value are valued in different ways. First, there are some things that we value for the sake of 
                                                 
 
10 This is not to say that such a view is indefensible. Rather, the view requires some defending. 
See Chris Heathwood, "The Problem of Defective Desires," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
83, no. 4 (2005). 
11 The examples are taken from Heathwood. Ibid. 
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something else; these are valued only instrumentally. Second, there are some things we value for 
their own sake; these are valued intrinsically. Third, there are some things that we value because 
their realization would be an instance of something we intrinsically value.12 When discussing 
well-being, philosophers are typically concerned with the second and third kinds of value. After 
all, things we value instrumentally derive their goodness entirely from those things (or instances 
of those things) we value intrinsically.  
 The problem with simple forms of subjectivism is that human beings are fallible. 
Specifically, we can fail in our pursuit of what we value.13 Most of us agree that our desires, 
beliefs, attitudes, and preferences may be ill-formed, irrational, inconsistent, repugnant, and the 
like. We may take something to be instrumentally valuable, when in fact it won’t get us closer to 
anything we value for its own sake. Perhaps we take the relevant r-relation towards something 
we assume to be intrinsically valuable, only to discover that it won’t make us any happier, any 
more satisfied, or any better off. Perhaps the sports car I foolishly buy brings me no closer to the 
popularity I crave; the ice cream I buy to satisfy my sweet tooth turns out not to be the instance 
of pleasure I originally imagined it to be. I may think that committing myself to a particular 
vocation would be an instance of meaningful work—which I value—when in fact it would not. 
In each of these cases, I clearly value something. Otherwise, I would not take (or consider 
                                                 
 
12 This is often taken to be a distinct category from the first and second. Assume that to value is 
to desire something. I do not intrinsically desire to give my friend $5, but I do have an intrinsic 
desire to be just; if I owe him $5, my giving him the money is not instrumental to my being just, 
but is itself an instance of me being just. Tim Schroeder, "Desire," in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
13 It seems that Heathwood must deny this. Papism aside, I am generally suspicious of claims of 
infallibility. That said, Heathwood’s position is not too far from the old scholastic dictum: de 
gustibus non est disputandum.  
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taking) any action towards it. But in each of these cases, when I obtain what I thought I valued, I 
ended up no better off.  
 One way of explaining this problem is by distinguishing between actual and apparent 
values. That is, what strikes us as worth pursuing in a given moment might not—under more 
ideal circumstances—really be all that valuable. Many subjectivist philosophers, in recognizing 
this fact, have argued that conditions c in their respective theories of value ought to be 
counterfactual, idealized conditions. That is, a person’s actual values are those that he would 
have the right r-relation to in conditions that diminish the problems surrounding human 
fallibility. For example, Richard Brandt appears to argue that someone (actually) values 
something insofar as he would desire it after “cognitive psychotherapy” provides him with full 
and vivid exposure to logic and the relevant facts.14 David Lewis suggests that an agent 
(actually) values something “just in case [he] would, under conditions of full imaginative 
acquaintance with the alternatives, desire to desire it.”15 Dale Dorsey maintains that an agent 
(actually) values something if he believes it to be good under conditions of consideration and 
coherence.16 Connie Rosati argues that an agent (actually) values something if he would desire it 
in certain (unspecified) idealized conditions he (actually) cares about having.17 The possibilities 
                                                 
 
14 Richard  Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 113. 
15 David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes 63 (1989).  
16 Dorsey, "Idealization and the Heart of Subjectivism," 203-08. 
17 Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," 403. 
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are endless, but the goal in each case is the same: to have a theory of value that avoids the Scylla 
and Charybdis of fallibility and alienation. 
 As a result, most subjectivists accept the premise that a certain amount of idealization 
within a theory of value does not impermissibly alienate an agent from his good. So long as 
one’s welfare theory retains a direct connection to an agent’s values, welfare internalism remains 
satisfied.18 
 What I wish to point out in this paper is that both building blocks of subjectivism—the 
good-value link coupled with a theory of value—may harmoniously exist within an objectivist 
theory of well-being. That is, a theory of well-being can simultaneously link an agent’s good 
with his values while recognizing certain things as categorically, objectively good for us as 
humans. As objectivist theories of well-being are often criticized for their inability to 
accommodate the good-value link (or the “deeply plausible thought,” or the “internalist 
constraint,” etc.), an objectivist, internalist theory of well-being would show that such criticism 
is misplaced. And such objectivist, internalist theories are not only possible in principle—they 
have been defended at various times throughout the history of philosophy. In the following 
section, I argue that this is true of Thomas Aquinas’ theory of natural law.  
III. Thomistic Theories of Value 
                                                 
 
18 Dorsey goes on to argue that theories that use idealized, counterfactual conditions c in the 
good-value link are less successful at satisfying the “deeply plausible thought” that a person’s 
good should not unduly alienate her. Without engaging much with this argument, I will assume 
that, for purposes of the good-value link, conditions c must be actual, present conditions. Dorsey, 
"Idealization and the Heart of Subjectivism," 212. 
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I argue that Aquinas’ natural law theory satisfies welfare internalism; that is, it affirms 
and incorporates the good-value link. There are, I believe, a number of ways to faithfully 
characterize Aquinas’ theory. I will examine two possible characterizations: one grounded on 
what Aquinas calls “natural inclinations,” and another based on our beliefs about what is good or 
bad for us. What follows is a brief sketch of Aquinas’ view, in order to show that it does, in fact, 
satisfy welfare internalism.  
In an oft-cited passage in the Summa Theologica, Aquinas describes natural law as a 
rational creature’s participation in God’s governance of the universe.19 To put this in more 
prosaic language: rational creatures must actively pursue their God-given ends (“ends” in the 
teleological-metaphysical sense) through the use of reason and judgment. But we do not operate 
in the dark. Obviously, as a Christian, Aquinas believes that God has revealed certain principles 
that we ought to live by in pursuit of our ends.20 But more importantly—for this essay—Aquinas 
believes that, to a certain extent, some basic principles of rationality are (to use St. Paul’s phrase) 
written “in our hearts.”21 
Aquinas argues that we, using reason, can ascertain what is prudentially good and bad for 
us.22 In fact, the first principle of practical reason—that good is to be done and evil avoided—is 
                                                 
 
19 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New 
Advent, 1920). I-IIae, Q.91 a.2.  
20 Ibid., I-IIae, Q.91 a.4. 
21 Romans 2:15.   
22 I use the term “prudentially” here, though I am not convinced that Aquinas recognizes the 
distinction between moral and prudential goodness. Both morality and prudence, as far as 
Aquinas is concerned, deal with what ought to be done—that is, what is good—all things 
considered.  
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immediately self-evident.23 This is because, at least for Aquinas, part of what it means to be good 
is to be worth doing.24 In this context, goodness and badness are formal notions—the terms 
simply track what is to be done and what is to be avoided.25 
The question then becomes, what is it that is intrinsically good for us? What, in 
particular, ought to be done (at least, prudentially speaking)? Following Aristotle, Aquinas 
argues that all created things have, by their nature, a certain telos, that telos being the thing’s 
perfection or fulfillment.26 What constitutes this telos becomes evident upon observation of the 
thing’s natural tendencies and inclinations.27 As we recall from our first introduction to 
Aristotle’s teleology, an acorn’s inherent, natural tendency (which a biologist might describe) is 
to become an oak tree—and a strong, healthy one at that. Humans are analogous insofar as we 
too have natural inclinations that draw us towards our perfection or fulfillment. The disanalogy is 
evident when we recall that rational creatures must actively choose to pursue the objects of their 
natural inclinations; we must choose to pursue the perfection or fulfillment proper to our 
nature.28 And as Aquinas points out, we are not inclined towards these objects by mere 
                                                 
 
23 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae, Q.94 a.2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 I understand that not all contemporary philosophers take this formal approach to goodness. But 
it is this understanding of goodness that—I believe—renders the scholastic “guise of the good” 
doctrine plausible. 
26 See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae Q.1, a.6. 
27 There is a possible exception, insofar as Christians believe that God has, through grace, 
offered humans a share in perfection and fulfillment beyond our natural capacities and towards 
which we may not naturally tend, since the end is beyond the reach of our nature. I leave this 
discussion aside for the purposes of this paper.   
28 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae Q.91, a.2. 
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happenstance; we are drawn to them because they are good for us.29 That is, because we are the 
kind of beings we are, the objects of our natural inclinations are—at least to some degree—
perfective and fulfilling of us. And insofar as we pursue them, we implicitly recognize this fact.  
Aquinas provides a short, cursory list of objects of our natural inclinations. The list is by 
no means exhaustive, but the examples he provides illustrate the broad range of objectively good 
things available for human pursuit. Some of our natural inclinations are instinctual and 
animalistic; we are drawn towards goods like food, health, and sex, self-preservation.30 Other 
inclinations are proper to rational agents as such: the desire for knowledge, interpersonal 
harmony, justice, rationality, and the like.31 Philosophers have, of course, disagreed about 
whether Aquinas’ list is correct or complete, but correctly identifying the objects of our natural 
                                                 
 
29 Ibid., I-IIae Q.94, a.2. 
30 I am here only concerned with intrinsic goodness or badness of these things, which depend on 
their fittingness to human beings as such. Obviously, there can be morally good and bad ways to 
pursue these goods; it is the job of the moral philosopher to specify under what conditions such a 
good ought to be sought, at least morally speaking. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
31 As a matter of mere terminology, philosophers disagree about whether our inclination to such 
things should be called “natural inclinations.” Often, scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophers 
distinguish between natural inclinations (tendencies of things according to the laws of physics, 
chemistry, and—to an extent—biology), sensitive appetites (tendencies of things to towards 
goods apprehended by the senses), and the rational appetite (tendencies of rational beings 
towards intellectually apprehended goods). See Bernard J. Wuellner, A Dictionary of Scholastic 
Philosophy, 2d ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1966). I see no need to draw such a 
distinction for the purposes of this paper. Because humans are—by nature—physical, biological, 
sensate, and rational creatures, I will group all inclinations stemming from human nature as 
“natural inclinations.”   
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inclinations is immaterial to this essay.32 In any case, the basic point is: those things that are 
intrinsically good for us are those that satisfy our natural inclinations. 
This, then, is the backdrop for Aquinas’ theory of practical reason. Aquinas argues that 
every properly human act—that is, every rational act—is undertaken for the sake of some 
intrinsic good.33 After all, we act because we seek the perfection, fulfillment, and happiness (in 
the Aristotelian sense) that our nature inclines us towards. And it is just those objects of our 
natural inclinations that offer the perfection, fulfillment, and happiness we seek with each action. 
A quick reflection may illustrate (though not prove) this point. The act of counting blades of 
grass within scientific inquiry strikes us as rational and “worth doing” (though perhaps not by 
us). Insofar as we take that action to be rational or intelligible, we presumably intuit that there is 
some objective good sought by the action—for example, scientific knowledge. At the same time, 
counting blades of grass “for its own sake” likely does not strike us as rational and intelligible; 
this indicates that there is no intrinsic good the grass-counter is seeking in his action (at least, so 
far as we can tell). So either the person counting the blades of grass for its own sake is acting 
irrationally—i.e. not engaging in a truly human act—or is doing so under a misunderstanding of 
what his good consists in. 
 Two quick clarifications. First, none of this is meant to imply that humans always 
correctly pursue the objects of their natural inclinations. Even if we correctly identify the proper 
object of our natural inclinations, we may choose improper or ineffective means to obtain that 
                                                 
 
32 See, e.g., Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality, 96-135; John Finnis, Natural Law 
and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 81-92. 
33 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae Q.8, a.1. 
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object.34 For example, assume someone rightly acknowledges that knowledge is intrinsically 
good for him; he may still choose means (perhaps culpably, perhaps innocently) that will not get 
him any closer to knowledge. Perhaps, in his quest for knowledge, he develops a desire to read 
books on astrology. His desire is rational insofar as he pursues an object of a natural 
inclination—i.e. knowledge—but he has chosen the wrong path in his pursuit. Similarly, 
someone might mis-identify something as intrinsically good. The same curious astrology student 
may take the study of astrology itself to be an instance of knowledge that is good-in-itself. In 
each of these cases, the student is presumably operating on a mistaken belief about the scientific 
merits of astrology, but he is still pursuing the object of a natural inclination.35 
 Second, Aquinas leaves open the possibility that humans will develop non-natural 
inclinations that may take precedence over their natural inclinations.36 Likewise, passions may 
arise in humans such that they act contrary to their natural inclinations.37 Thus our natural 
inclinations might end up being ignored, neglected, or otherwise unpursued (or at least, less 
emphatically pursued) because of our attachments. For example, someone might pursue wealth at 
the expense of health, family, or justice. Even if he acts with perfect instrumental rationality—
that is, he always chooses the most effective means of acquiring wealth—he is nevertheless 
irrational insofar as he does not act for the sake of some intrinsically valuable good. After all—as 
Aquinas and Aristotle remind us—money has only instrumental value.38 
                                                 
 
34 Ibid., I-IIae Q.13, a.3; Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, vol. III (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), I-IIae Q.13, a.3. 
35 Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Q.27-44. 
36 Summa Theologica, I-IIae Q.71 a.2; Q.91 a.6. 
37 Ibid., I-IIae, Q.77. 
38 Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), I ¶ 70. 
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 By claiming that every rational action is undertaken for the sake of some intrinsic good, 
or that all of our natural inclinations direct us towards some intrinsic good, Aquinas is not 
claiming that we always succeed in obtaining such a good. Nor does he even claim that the 
conscious object of our pursuit is, in fact, intrinsically good. Rather, it is simply that we are 
naturally inclined towards our perfection and its constitutive goods, whatever they are. And it is 
those objects of our natural inclinations in which our perfection, fulfillment, and happiness 
consist. But we can fail both in our knowledge of what those goods are, and in our pursuit of 
them.  
 The point is that Thomas Aquinas—an objectivist about well-being—has a theory of 
value amenable to welfare internalism. Given what has been discussed about natural inclinations, 
the Thomist might put forward something like the following:  
Thomist Theory of Value 1: for any object, event, state, etc., φ and agent x, x values φ 
insofar as x has a natural inclination towards φ under conditions c.  
 
This formulation is, of course, incomplete. The Thomist must still specify conditions c. But I’m 
not sure that it matters how c is characterized in this context. After all, the term “natural 
inclination” refers to just those inclinations that are natural to or inherent in beings by virtue of 
the kinds of things they are. Presumably, such inclinations would exist in all relevant conditions, 
assuming we hold the agent’s nature constant. But for the purpose of this argument, conditions c 
can be idealized as necessary in order to render the argument plausible. As we have seen, such 
idealization appears to be a commonly accepted move among subjectivist philosophers; as such, 
idealization within a theory of value does not intolerably alienate an agent from his good.39 
                                                 
 
39 Dorsey, "Idealization and the Heart of Subjectivism." 
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 Equipped with this theory of value, the Thomist can retain both an objectivist theory of 
well-being and affirm welfare internalism. After all, it is only those goods that x has natural 
inclinations toward that count as good for him. At the same time, which goods x has natural 
inclinations towards is determined ultimately by objective facts about human nature. 
 An alternative theory of value is also available to the Thomist.40 Without even 
specifically mentioning natural inclinations, the Thomist might accept something like the 
following:  
The Thomist Theory of Value 2: for any object, event, state, etc., φ and agent x, x values φ 
insofar as x judges φ as good under conditions c. 
 
This is more-or-less identical to the theory of value offered by Dorsey.41 And like Dorsey’s 
theory—and like most other subjectivist theories of value—conditions c can be idealized, 
counterfactual conditions. As we have seen, it is not intolerably alienating to require x to have 
“all the relevant facts,” to thoroughly consider the relevant circumstances, or to maintain 
consistent and coherent beliefs.42 Nor is it intolerably alienating to require x to be acting 
according to practical reason.43 The Thomist could adopt each of these proposed counterfactual 
conditions as part of this second theory of value. He may, in addition, want to also require that 
                                                 
 
40 These theories, at least for the Thomist, will be co-extensive. Because Aquinas offers an 
objectivist theory, conditions c in the second theory can be rigged such that the agent always 
values what he ought. Obviously, this move is generally not available to subjectivists, but that is 
partly why I find objectivism a more compelling view.  
41 See, e.g., Dale Dorsey, "Subjectivism without Desire," Philosophical Review 121, no. 3 
(2012). 
42 See Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right; Dorsey, "Idealization and the Heart of 
Subjectivism." 
43 Connie S. Rosati, "Internalism and the Good for a Person," Ethics 106, no. 2 (1996): 305 n.15. 
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the agent be perfectly virtuous, in order to ensure that irrationality, lack of self-control, vice, and 
the passions do not unduly interfere with x’s judgment about what is good. 
 We can thus return to the good-value link. The good-value link is supposed to ensure that 
a welfare theory satisfies welfare internalism. And subjectivism is supposed to be appealing, at 
least in large part, because it generally satisfies welfare internalism. But we have just seen that 
the Thomistic natural law theory can easily accommodate welfare internalism. Whether we 
characterize the Thomistic theory of value in terms of natural inclinations or in terms of idealized 
rationality, the objectivist, perfectionist natural law theory of Aquinas satisfies the good-value 
link. And there seems to be no reason why other objectivist theories of well-being cannot 
similarly accommodate welfare internalism. After all, philosophers have long treated welfare 
internalism as something of a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition.44 That is, 
philosophers who have defended welfare internalism argue that there must be some link between 
an agent and his good—not that the link solely determine the agent’s good. Thus the 
compatibility of welfare internalism and objectivism; under Aquinas’ theory, things are not good 
for someone solely because they are valued (though that may be how we know they are good), 
rather, things are valued—i.e. we are naturally inclined towards them, or we judge them as good 
under proper conditions—because they are perfective of us; they fulfill us. Subjectivism does not 
have a monopoly on welfare internalism. The subjectivist cannot, therefore, argue that 
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subjectivism is a more plausible family of welfare theories because it can accommodate welfare 
internalism. Welfare internalism can easily be found elsewhere.  
IV. Objections and Replies 
A number of objections might arise here. First, one might simply point out that the above 
theories of value are a bit vague. This is true—I have thus far provided only a sketch of possible 
Thomistic theories. I have not attempted to explain precisely what counts as a natural inclination, 
nor do I argue for any particular counterfactual conditions that a Thomist might wish to include 
within a theory of value.  
My goal, however, was not to defend a particular view of natural inclinations or of 
Aquinas’ precise understanding of practical rationality. Rather, I merely hoped to show that 
welfare internalism can be satisfied by a Thomistic theory of value. Because of the frequent 
disagreement between Thomistic scholars about how to identify and categorize natural 
inclinations, I deliberately avoided precisely specifying their nature, content, and how we know 
them. But I take it that a number of Thomistic theories will fit within the general framework that 
I described above.  
Take, for example, John Finnis’ understanding of natural inclinations. Finnis argues that 
natural inclinations are not demonstrable from abstract, speculative philosophical reasoning—we 
cannot start with a prior understanding of human nature and work backwards to identify our 
natural inclinations.45 Rather, a natural inclination is a certain kind of urge or motivational force 
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that, if acted upon, would render an action intelligible.46 On the other hand, someone like 
Anthony Lisska argues that natural inclinations are known only through speculative reason and 
from a prior understanding of human nature.47 Natural inclinations are an object’s essential 
dispositional properties that must be uncovered through philosophical analysis; it is possible that 
such an inclination does not (implicitly or explicitly) factor into an agent’s rational decision-
making.48 And philosophers like Mark Murphy advocate for a middle ground—that natural 
inclinations are those that can be recognized as inclining us towards (what we theoretically 
understand to be) human flourishing and that provide us with good reasons for acting.49 In any 
case, natural inclinations provide the necessary link between the agent and his good. The fact 
that philosophers disagree about how, precisely, to characterize this relation is immaterial for the 
present argument. 
The second objection to the Thomistic theories of value above is that they are 
philosophically unhelpful. In fact, it might be argued that there is some circularity present in the 
above analysis. One might argue that both of the theories above have some built-in normative 
content. As such, the theories are not terribly helpful in identifying an agent’s good, since the 
above theories of value seem to take the good as prior to value.  
Take, for example, the first Thomistic theory of value. Is it possible to give a purely 
descriptive (i.e. non-evaluative) formulation of natural inclinations? It seems that under any view 
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of natural inclinations described above, there must be some evaluative content informing what 
constitutes a natural inclination. Under Finnis’ view, objects of our natural inclinations render an 
action intelligible—but intelligibility is a product of substantive practical reason. That is, an 
action is only intelligible insofar as its object already strikes us as something worth pursuing (i.e. 
“good”).50 Under Lisska’s view, natural inclinations likewise come with pre-installed normative 
content, since our knowledge of our natural inclinations is derived from our prior understanding 
of human flourishing.51 And Murphy’s middle-ground position imports normative content from 
both sources.52 One might rightly argue that, under pretty much all characterizations of natural 
inclinations, normative content may be snuck into the first Thomistic theory of value. And the 
same could be said for the second Thomistic theory of value. While there is no explicit 
normative content within the theory itself, the Thomist—as an objectivist—must construct 
conditions c such that the agent will always end up getting the “right result.” But insofar as there 
is a right result to be got, the Thomistic theories of value fail to explain what makes something 
good for someone.  
I have two responses to this objection. First, I do not believe that the above theories of 
value necessarily sneak in any more normative language or content than do equivalent 
subjectivist welfare theories. Recall that the starting point, for Aquinas, is that happiness is the 
end towards which all of our actions are derived.53 We may fail to achieve this end for a variety 
of reasons—failures of instrumental rationality, failures in recognizing in what happiness 
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consists, failures of virtue, failures of circumstance, etc.—but nonetheless, happiness remains a 
chief aim. Our natural inclinations, understood at a purely formal level, are just those that lead us 
towards happiness (i.e. as our ultimate end). And prudential goodness is simply a measure of 
whether and to what extent something will bring us closer to the ultimate end of happiness. We 
can thus have a purely formal sketch of natural inclinations, fit for a theory of value, that does 
not sneak in any substantive normative content. This, I think, ought to satisfy objecting 
subjectivists. Insofar as someone—even a subjectivist—accepts Aristotle’s truism that happiness 
(in its formal sense) is our chief aim, then the objects of our desires, judgments, or pro-attitudes 
(or whatever the key relation-r of a theory of value happens to be) are good for us in the same 
way as are the objects of our natural inclinations within the Thomistic theory. That is, regardless 
of the theory of value, the goods related to by relation-r are good for us insofar as they bring us 
closer  to--or are constitutive components of--to this formal notion we call “happiness.”  
The same could be said for the second Thomistic theory of value. A subjectivist might 
object to importing implicit normative content into conditions c within the second Thomistic 
theory of value. But subjectivist philosophers often imply normative content within their own 
theories of value. Recall that Richard Brandt suggested that “cognitive psychotherapy” would be 
required to correctly identify someone’s values. 54 Cognitive therapy presupposes the possibility 
of a properly-functioning mind (a normative concept); Brandt’s theory is rigged to guarantee that 
the agent is of such a mind for the satisfaction of his desires to be good for him. The Thomistic 
theory is no different—like Brandt’s counterfactual conditions, the counterfactual conditions 
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within the Thomistic theory are intended to guarantee that the agent is of such a mind (or 
possesses such virtue) that his judgments about the good properly track what is, in fact, good for 
him. Insofar as Brandt requires cognitive psychotherapy for an agent’s r-relation (desire) to 
count as value (i.e. good for him), so too can Aquinas require virtue for an agent’s r-relation 
(judgment) to count as value (i.e. good for him). Similarly, subjectivist philosophers often invoke 
normative terms like coherence and consistency, thereby reading into the conditions of valuing 
certain norms of practical reason. It is hard to see how employing such formal, normative 
concepts within a theory of value is so objectionable, when in fact most subjectivist philosophers 
employ such concepts themselves.  
My second response is that this objection may simply miss the point. Even if the 
Thomistic theories of value snuck normative content into the theory of value in ways that 
subjectivist theories do not—so what? Including such normative content—even if it is 
substantive normative content—in a theory of value is simply not a problem within an objectivist 
theory of well-being. If the above theories of value were being used to (fully) determine or 
explain what constitutes an agent’s good, and they indeed include substantive, normative 
content, then perhaps that would be a problem; perhaps we would then approach circularity. But 
the Thomistic theories above are not intended to (fully) explain or determine the source of 
goodness; goodness is instead determined and explained (at least partially) by a perfectionistic 
account of human nature.55 Rather, I offer the Thomistic theories as a mere part of a larger, 
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objectivist theory of well-being—as such, the good need not be (and cannot be) fully determined 
or explained by reference to an individual’s values.  
V. Assessing Objectivism and Subjectivism 
 The real objection, it seems, is not to the Thomistic theories of value. Rather, insofar as 
someone objects to the fact that a person’s good is not (fully) determined by his values, it seems 
that the objection is directed not at my particular welfare theory, but at objectivism itself. And it 
is true, objectivist theories of well-being run a greater risk of alienating an agent from his good 
than do subjectivist theories. But as I have shown, at least some objectivist theories can indeed 
satisfy welfare internalism, which ought to ensure the non-alienation of an agent from his good. 
A. Do the Thomistic Theories of Value Alienate?  
 Nonetheless, someone may argue that objectivist theories—such as the one I offer here—
might still alienate an agent from his good, despite the fact they satisfy welfare internalism. After 
all, if prudential goodness is not wholly derived from an agent’s values, how can the objectivist 
really ensure that the agent is not alienated from his good? 
 I do not find this to be a serious problem. Or, rather, I do not think that this is a problem 
for objectivists any more than it is for subjectivists. In the real world, we do not know what a 
particular agent would take the relevant r-relation towards under idealized, counterfactual 
conditions. Suppose that both a subjectivist and an objectivist came across someone who valued 
nothing but self-harm.56 I presume that both the subjectivist and the objectivist would deny that 
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pursuing self-harm would be good for this person. But to maintain this position, both the 
subjectivist and the objectivist must appeal to some criteria for goodness and badness beyond the 
person’s actually-existing relevant r-relations. From the perspective of this unfortunate person, 
the pleas to avoid self-harm would appeal to notions of goodness and badness that at least seem 
intolerably alienating. It does not matter to the self-harming agent that he would take the proper 
r-relation to, say, physical health were he more rational, aware, or if he underwent cognitive 
therapy. At the end of the day, the subjectivist and objectivist are both telling this unfortunate 
fellow he’s wrong. He will feel alienated, even if the correct theory of value determines that he 
does, in fact, actually value physical health. And this would be the case whether the correct 
theory of welfare were subjectivist or objectivist; there is no reason to think that objectivism is 
any more potentially alienating than subjectivism, so long as the good-value link is satisfied. 
 Nor does it do much good to say that the r-relation must be—in order to avoid 
alienation—something of inherent motivational force, such as desire. The first Thomistic theory 
above appeals to natural inclinations, which do (under most interpretations of Aquinas) have 
motivational force. And while it is true that the second Thomistic theory is grounded in 
judgements and beliefs, this should not render someone’s good too alienating. It is worth noting 
that some subjectivists also accept theories of value based on judgments—so again, the 
Thomistic theory is no more alienating than its subjectivist counterparts.57 Moreover, Aquinas 
does not accept instrumentalism of practical reason. Rather, he believes that we have an inherent, 
natural desire for the good understood as such; thus cognitive apprehension of the good has 
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motivational force.58 For this reason, it cannot be said that a purely cognitive theory of value 
generates alienation from the good. So Aquinas’ objectivist welfare theory does not appear to be 
intolerably alienating; rather, as I will argue, it could be that objectivist theories are actually less 
alienating than subjectivist alternatives. 
B. Subjectivism and Fallibility 
The self-harm example reveals one of the reasons that I am suspicious of welfare 
subjectivism. Namely, it is difficult to see what a subjectivist’s justification is for maintaining 
that an agent must be under certain counterfactual, idealized conditions for the relevant r-relation 
to count as valuing. Examine the following:  
Intuitive Fallibility: x takes relevant relation r towards φ in actually-existing conditions, 
but we intuitively take φ to be quite bad for x. 
 
The welfare theorist has a choice. He can accept that φ is, in fact, good for x, despite his 
intuitions. Or he can deny that φ is good for x, and instead say that the object x takes relation-r 
towards in counterfactual, idealized conditions is instead what is good for x. For the objectivist 
(committed to internalism), if φ is not objectively good, he can simply deny that x values φ; that 
is, the relevant r-relation must exist under certain idealized conditions to count as valuing. The 
subjectivist may likewise want to deny the goodness of φ—but on what grounds? Why is a 
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theory that denies the goodness of φ more plausible than one that affirms it? Beyond mere 
intuition, it is unclear what the subjectivist’s justification is for requiring idealized conditions.59 
  One possible justification for requiring idealized conditions is that determining what one 
values—because of the nature of value—requires a certain level of idealization. For example, 
perhaps in order to understand what someone values, we must first impose something like 
coherence and consideration requirements.60 Or perhaps to determine an agent’s values, he must 
first have “an accurate understanding phenomenological and otherwise, of what an option would 
be like are responsive to the true nature of the option under consideration.”61  
 Fair enough. But this does not solve the problem of intuitive fallibility. Take the 
following subjectivist theory of value:  
Sobel-Dorsey Idealization: x values φ insofar as x would take relation r towards φ if x 
adequately considered what φ would truly be like (phenomenologically and otherwise), 
and taking relation r towards φ is coherent with x’s other beliefs and values.62 
 
This theory of value puts x in an epistemic, psychological condition such that his values are 
discernable and the available options are fully understood (in the right way). Nonetheless, we can 
still run the intuitive fallibility argument. Suppose that x values self-harm. Again, the welfare 
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theorist has a choice: he can either accept the counter-intuitive result, or he can amend the theory 
of value. But for a subjectivist, any amendment to the theory must be purely formal—it cannot 
(necessarily) entail any substantive result about what x will, in fact, end up valuing. So whatever 
additional conditions are added—perfect instrumental rationality, knowledge of all the non-
evaluative facts, “cognitive psychotherapy,” and the like—those conditions cannot guarantee a 
substantive result (such as not valuing self-harm).63 Moreover, any amendment to the theory of 
value to avoid an undesirable result must be justified by considerations other than mere formal 
precision (since those are already taken into account); nor can it be grounded in a belief that the 
theory gets “the wrong result.” After all, at least at some point, the subjectivist must accept the 
infallibility of the person’s values. Thus, the subjectivist is stuck with the possibility of an agent 
valuing intuitively-bad things. Objectivist theories have no such problem.  
 None of this may worry a sufficiently committed subjectivist. But this line of reasoning 
forces the question: what is more likely—that subjectivism is true, or that self-harm can be good 
for someone? Insofar as self-harm’s goodness is implausible, so too is subjectivism. But 
someone committed to internalism need not fret—as we have seen, there are objectivist theories 
of well-being that can accept internalism. Thus, objective theories can avoid some of 
subjectivism’s inherent problems while adopting one of its most attractive features.  
C. Subjectivism and Value 
Another related problem for subjectivism is that, under subjectivism, there can be no 
prudential, non-instrumental reason to value anything. Suppose that x believes he values φ, and 
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thinks that φ would also be good for y. What reason can x give to y for valuing φ? Under 
subjectivism, no non-instrumental, prudential reason can be given. Unlike objectivism, the 
subjectivist cannot explain why, as a normative matter, φ ought to be valued. The objectivist can: 
φ ought to be valued because (for example) given human nature, it is fulfilling or perfective of 
us. That is, φ is a partial realization of the happiness and human flourishing we necessarily seek 
in a human act.64  
This scenario might be understood differently, however. The subjectivist might reply by 
saying that x is not really trying to convince y to value φ; rather, x is in fact trying to point out 
that he (y) already values φ. Thus, x might point to certain facts about the world, certain 
experiences, as well as y’s other beliefs and values in order to show that, actually, y does value φ 
and should therefore pursue it.65 But this does not really solve the problem. Because y might, as a 
result of x’s persuasion, come to (correctly) recognize that he does, in fact, value φ. But if y then 
asks x whether he should retain this value—what answer can x give?66 If x is an objectivist, he 
can reply by explaining why φ is, in fact, objectively good and ought to be valued. But if x is a 
subjectivist, he can offer no explanation. This strikes me as intolerably alienating—it seems that 
x is in a certain sense alienated from his good—for subjectivism can provide him no (prudential, 
intrinsic) reason for why he ought to retain the values that determine his good. 
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If y indeed values φ (assuming, let’s say, a perfectly idealized subjectivist theory of 
value), then, as a subjectivist, x can provide no (prudential) reason to continue valuing φ. True, x 
might point to a few accidental factors—sunk costs, attainability, etc. But these are mere 
instrumental reasons; their force is wholly derivative of whatever intrinsic reason y has to value 
φ. And under subjectivism, y has no intrinsic reason to value φ. We can also flip the situation; 
suppose now that y (correctly) recognizes that he values ψ. He then asks (perhaps because of 
social disapproval of ψ) whether he should stop valuing ψ. Again, x can provide no non-
instrumental, non-accidental reason for y to stop valuing ψ. (We could also assume that ψ is the 
only thing y values, so that any appeal to social stigma, wealth, friendships, virtue, etc. will fall 
on deaf ears—for y values none of those things.) This too appears alienating—there is no 
intrinsic “fit” or “resonance” between y and his two options: to continue valuing ψ or to stop 
valuing ψ. There would be such a fit under the Thomistic approach; if ψ were, in fact, objectively 
good, then y’s exercise of practical reason would (ideally) be responsive to that fact, and his 
natural inclinations would draw him towards it. But this response is not available to the 
subjectivist.  
Again, this might not convince any thoroughly committed subjectivist of subjectivism’s 
problems. But I take it as a starting point that we ought to prudentially value what’s good for us. 
It is difficult for the subjectivist to explain why we prudentially ought to value anything at all—
beyond a mere nod to the fact that we have to value something in order for our well-being to 
improve. But this is an empty response. For one, it seems to presuppose that we ought to value 
our well-being, and thus may end up begging the question. But more formally speaking: valuing 
something is only good for someone insofar as it creates the possibility of obtaining the thing 
valued. Creating the possibility of obtaining thing valued, however, is not good in itself. Rather, 
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it is only good insofar as the thing valued is good. But, according to subjectivism, nothing is 
intrinsically good prior to its being valued. The conclusion: under subjectivism, there’s no 
intrinsic, prudential reason to value anything. And I take this to be an odd result. Moreover, it 
seems that an agent’s lack of reasons to value something are intolerably alienating, in much the 
same way that an agent’s lack of motivational states towards, evaluative judgments about, or 
intrinsic desires for her good would be intolerably alienating.67 
VI. Conclusion 
The point is simple: welfare subjectivism does not have a monopoly on welfare 
internalism. Rather, welfare internalism can be easily adopted by objectivist theories. And 
indeed, prominent objectivist welfare theories have incorporated at least some version of welfare 
internalism. Thomas Aquinas, I argue, puts forth one such theory. At bottom, there must be some 
real link between an agent and his good, whether we cash that out in terms of human nature (i.e. 
natural inclinations) or in terms of rationality (i.e. rational judgment). The Thomistic theories of 
value, I argue, are no more alienating than their subjectivist counterparts; there is no reason to 
reject Aquinas’ theory (much less welfare objectivism in principle) on the grounds that it denies 
welfare internalism.  
At the same time, Aquinas’ objectivist theory can avoid many of the common pitfalls of 
subjectivism. Unlike subjectivism, an objectivist theory can explain why someone ought to value 
something. Namely, that it is good. And this would be the case even if it were not, in fact, valued 
by the person. (Aquinas, in adopting internalism, accepts that, at least on some level, good is, in 
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fact, valued by us as humans—whether at the level of a natural inclination or at the level of 
idealized judgment—but this is, in a sense, coincident, not causal). Moreover, objectivist 
philosophers have justification for amending theories of value in such a way that the agent’s 
values track what is antecedently known, believed, or theorized to be good for him. The 
subjectivist cannot; beyond mere formal tinkering with a theory of value in order to correctly and 
specify what, exactly, an agent values, a subjectivist is forced to provide a different explanation 
for why the theory is unacceptable or bite the bullet on a counter-intuitive result.  
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Paper 2: Finding Pleasure and Satisfaction in Perfectionism 
I. Introduction 
Welfare perfectionism holds that φ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the 
extent that, φ perfects (or is a perfection of) x’s nature or certain key faculties of x.68 Because x’s 
nature and faculties are typically defined without reference to individual (i.e. subjective) 
attitudes, preferences, desires, values, and mental states of x, welfare perfectionism is taken to be 
an objective—as opposed to subjective—theory of well-being. This is because subjective 
theories ground well-being in a subject’s attitudes, preferences desires, values, or mental states, 
whereas objective theories ground well-being in facts that are, at least to some degree, 
independent of such subjective considerations.69 
 There are various forms of welfare perfectionism. After all, a full theory of welfare 
perfectionism would require a description or definition of x’s nature or faculties; determining the 
essence, core capacities, or central features of (for example) human nature is by itself a 
momentous philosophical undertaking, which engenders countless debate and disagreement. 
Two perfectionists with differing accounts of human nature, then, would likely have different 
substantive accounts of what is good for humans. Moreover, philosophers might disagree about 
how to characterize x in the first place. In the case of humans, one might disagree about whether 
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the nature to be considered is human nature (i.e. the nature of a biological species), or rational 
nature (i.e. the nature of a rational decisionmaker), or any other alternate characterization.70 
Finally, perfectionists might disagree about how one perfects his or her nature—what actions, 
occasions, or things actually perfect x’s nature in a way that contributes towards well-being.71 
Nevertheless, these various flavors of welfare perfectionism share the name insofar as they 
maintain that well-being is constituted by the perfection or fulfillment of certain potencies. 
 Every theory has critics; welfare perfectionism is no exception. Many philosophers find 
welfare perfectionism implausible because it is arguably under-inclusive. That is, it fails to count 
as good certain acts, events, and things that intuitively improve one’s quality of life. For 
example, some philosophers intuit that the satisfaction of desires—at least in some 
circumstances—directly contributes to well-being. Likewise, philosophers intuit that the 
experience of pleasure—at least in certain circumstances—directly contributes to well-being. 
The problem for welfare perfectionism is straightforward: neither desire-satisfaction nor the 
experience of pleasure seem to perfect (or be perfections of) one’s nature.  
 This, then, leaves two options for the welfare perfectionist. He can “bite the bullet” and 
argue that these intuitions are mistaken; that we are wrong to think that pleasure and desire-
satisfaction themselves impact well-being. Alternatively, he can explain how such intuitive 
goods—despite their apparent incompatibility with welfare perfectionism—can nevertheless 
directly contribute to well-being. In this paper, I advance the latter approach. In particular, I 
argue that at least for some perfectionists—and specifically for Thomas Aquinas—desire-
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satisfaction and pleasure both directly contribute to well-being, even within welfare 
perfectionism. Whatever other objections people may have to the philosophy of Aquinas, one 
cannot argue that their perfectionistic theories of well-being neglect the intuitive importance of 
desire-satisfaction and pleasure.  
 A brief roadmap. In the first section, I will present the arguments made against welfare 
perfectionism by its critics, in particular those who believe that perfectionism cannot 
accommodate our intuition that certain elements of experience—such as pleasure or 
satisfaction—make our lives better. I will then briefly describe two leading perfectionist theories, 
so we can see why such theories do in fact seem to exclude desire-satisfaction and pleasure from 
the conversation about what’s good for us. I will then go on to explain why certain forms of 
perfectionism need not reject the importance of desire and pleasure. To do this, I will sketch 
out—in fairly general terms—certain aspects of Aquinas’ philosophy. His account of human 
well-being provides a historical example of a perfectionist theory that affirms the importance of 
desire and pleasure. We end with the conclusion that, regardless of the substantive merits of the 
Thomistic approach, welfare perfectionism is perfectly consistent with the intuition that satisfied 
desires and pleasure tend to make our lives go better. 
II. Critiques of Welfare Perfectionism 
 This, then, sets up a simple critique of perfectionism. In our daily lives, we often assume 
that pleasure is, all things being equal, better than pain. We assume that a life in which no desires 
are satisfied is missing out on something. The importance of satisfying our desires and having a 
pleasant go of life is straightforward and intuitive. Thus the critique: welfare perfectionism, it 
seems, cannot accommodate the intuitive importance of desire-satisfaction or pleasure. The life 
of practical or theoretical excellence—as Aristotle would have it—and the life of rational 
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perfection—as Kant would have it—prioritizes reason over the will, and virtuous conduct over 
pleasure-seeking. If the only intrinsic good is (say) rational excellence, then the satisfaction of 
desires or the experience of pleasure make no difference in how good one’s life is. The result 
would be a strange conception of welfare—one completely detached from subjective experience, 
pleasures, attitudes, preferences, desires, and values. Perfectionism, therefore, does not give us a 
plausible account of well-being.72 
 This argument has been framed in various ways. L.W. Sumner argues that perfectionist 
theories are not plausible theories of well-being because they fail to take into consideration an 
agent’s evaluative perspective in determining what is good for him.73 Sumner claims that, 
because perfectionism fails to take into an individual’s perspective, it fails at a conceptual level. I 
take this to be an extremely strong position—most philosophers, I think, do not assume 
perfectionism fails at the conceptual level. Nevertheless, perfectionist theories of well-being are 
said to “deny the influence of our desires.”74 And philosophers committed to the importance of 
                                                 
 
72 The arguments that I examine here are not the only arguments raised against perfectionism. 
Daniel Haybron raises an argument that is similar—like the general thrust of the argument here, 
Haybron points out that perfectionism delivers counter-intuitive results when evaluating the lives 
of certain people. Daniel M. Haybron, "Well-Being and Virtue," Journal of Ethics & Social 
Philosophy  (2007): 5-10. Instead of criticizing perfectionism’s ability to accommodate things 
like pleasure and desire-satisfaction in general, Haybron focuses on situations in which certain 
kinds of experience seem more appropriate for someone given his or her life situation. While I 
do not intend to combat this criticism here, I think that perfectionists certainly have tools at their 
disposal to respond to such objections. See, e.g., Antti Kauppinen, "Working Hard and Kicking 
Back: The Case for Diachronic Perfectionism," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy  (2009). 
73 Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, 24.  
74 Dorsey, "Three Arguments for Perfectionism," 59. 
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desire within welfare theories might therefore be turned off by perfectionism. Thus the 
challenge: can perfectionism recognize the necessity of desire-satisfaction within the good life?  
 A second challenge concerns the role of pleasure within the good life. Richard Arneson 
argues that perfectionism “denies value to much that seems worthwhile.”75 For example, he 
points to our intuition that certain “cheap thrills” seem to make our lives go better. As Arneson 
explains, cheap thrills are  
activities that provide pleasure and excitement without any significant effort or sacrifice 
on the part of the agent and also without the exercise or development of any of the 
agent’s significant talents. Cheap thrills are pleasures with no redeeming social value 
beyond their pleasantness.76  
 
Arneson goes on to say:  
 
I take it that the pleasures of cheap thrills will not register at all on a perfectionist 
measure of the prudential value of people’s lives, but I would think that if these pleasures 
were to disappear without replacement, the world would be immensely worse and most 
human lives significantly blighted.77  
 
We might call this the cheap-thrills challenge: can perfectionism affirm the intrinsic goodness of 
a broad class of lesser, minor goods unassociated with effort, sacrifice, or talent? Can 
perfectionism recognize the intrinsic value of “cheap thrills”?   
 I believe that both questions can be answered in the affirmative. A perfectionistic account 
of well-being can accommodate simple pleasures and “cheap thrills”—and it can do so without 
                                                 
 
75 Richard Arneson, "Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction," Social Philosophy and 
Policy 16, no. 1 (1999): 120. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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devolving into an objective-list theory.78 While several of the more popular perfectionist theories 
of welfare do deny the importance of desire and pleasure, the theory of Thomas Aquinas, which I 
will briefly outline in the second half of this paper, does not. And this shows, if I am successful, 
that perfectionism as such need not deny the importance of desire-satisfaction and pleasure. 
III. Leading Theories of Welfare Perfectionism 
 Two of the leading welfare perfectionists, Thomas Hurka and David Brink, do indeed 
suggest that desire and pleasure are largely irrelevant to well-being—or at least, can only play an 
accidental or instrumental role. The argument that perfectionism counter-intuitively neglects 
such presumably important things as pleasure and desire-satisfaction, then, may be well-
grounded when applied to their theories. And, as mentioned previously, such arguments are 
intuitive. All things being equal, we often think, a more pleasant human life is preferable to a less 
pleasant one; a life in which more desires are satisfied is likely better than one without such 
satisfactions.79 Neither Hurka nor Brink take this to be a compelling objection against their 
approaches—they simply deny that pleasure or desire-satisfaction plays a meaningful role in the 
quality of one’s life. But this is not a necessary consequence of perfectionism. Rather, 
perfectionism can easily accept the proposition that satisfaction and pleasure play meaningful 
roles in the good life. 
                                                 
 
78 This paper assumes that a perfectionist theory is preferable to an objective-list theory insofar 
as perfectionism can (by reference to human nature) provide a unifying explanation of the 
goodness of various things. Objective-list theory, by definition, provides no such explanation. 
This is not an objection against objective-list theories per se (after all, perhaps there simply is no 
explanation for why things are good for us), but generally speaking, we tend to favor theories 
with more explanatory power over those with less. 
79 Hurka would be unbothered by this prospect, as he offers perfectionism as a moral theory and 
not a theory of well-being. 
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 However, it may nevertheless still be important to explain why perfectionists such as 
Hurka and Brink—as well as other perfectionists with similar theories—do not find pleasure or 
desire-satisfaction important to well-being. In this section, I will present a brief sketch of their 
respective positions, presenting also their reasoning behind why they reject pleasure and desire 
as important. 
A. Thomas Hurka and the Aristotelian Approach 
In the opening pages of his 1993 book Perfectionism, Thomas Hurka presents the core of 
his theory of perfectionism:  
Certain properties, [perfectionism] says, constitute human nature or are definitive of 
humanity—they make humans humans. The good life, it then says, develops these 
properties to a high degree or realizes what is central to human nature.80 
 
For Hurka, this is the distinguishing feature of perfectionism. Various perfectionistic 
philosophers—including Plato, Aristotle, Marx, Kant and others—may disagree with one another 
about what properties actually constitute or define human nature, but they nonetheless agree that 
such properties are central to morality or well-being.  
 The relevant properties are those essential to human nature—that is, only those properties 
that humans possess necessarily.81 This is, at least for Hurka, one of the central selling points of 
his theory—that perfectionism calls us to develop that which is most fundamental to us as 
humans. Hurka readily adopts a broadly Aristotelian view of human nature which thereby 
informs his understanding of the human good: “physical perfection, which develops our physical 
                                                 
 
80 Hurka, Perfectionism, 3. 
81 Ibid., 11. 
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nature, and theoretical and practical perfection, which develop theoretical and practical 
rationality.”82 
 This results in a rather constrained view of the good; any purported good must somehow 
instantiate physical excellence or develop human nature as an exercise of “sophisticated 
rationality.”83 With this in mind, it is rather easy to see why desire-satisfaction or pleasure count 
for nothing when it comes to well-being. As Hurka explicitly states: “[w]hatever some 
philosophers have claimed, our intuitions recognize that mere pleasure is not a serious value.”84 
Moreover, “perfectionism does not find intrinsic value in pleasure, not even pleasure in what is 
good, nor does it find intrinsic disvalue in pain.”85 Pleasure, he argues, is a purely passive 
phenomenon, whereas in perfectionism, “the good is largely active.”86 Insofar as pleasure is 
simply something that happens to an agent, rather than something that the agent does, pleasure 
does not contribute to someone’ perfection.  
 This position, I should point out, is not merely a consequence of Hurka’s denial that he is 
engaging in welfare theory. The account of human perfection that he gives does not (obviously) 
hinge on whether he is employing it within a theory of morality or of well-being. Pleasure is 
                                                 
 
82 Ibid., 51. Other contemporary Aristotelian perfectionists include Philippa Foot and Richard 
Kraut. Richard Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007); Foot, Natural Goodness. Neither make an effort to show that pleasure is 
part of the good. 
83 Hurka, Perfectionism, 149. 
84 Ibid., 183. 
85 Ibid., 190. 
86 Ibid., 59. 
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passive, says Hurka, and therefore it does not play a role in human perfection—regardless of 
whether human perfection is considered in light of morality or prudential value.   
 At the same time, Hurka’s Aristotelian perfectionism is still able to accommodate a broad 
range of possible activities. For example, he argues that using one’s rationality to further the 
good of other people is itself intrinsically good—this allows him to say that, for example, love is 
a good thing; or at least that “the active pursuit of others’ perfection” is intrinsically good.87 So 
relationships of love—which are often characterized by desire and pleasure—can still be 
important within Hurka’s framework. It is simply that what is valuable about such relationships 
is that they require the use and development of practical rationality. After all, coordinating 
efforts with other people (including in situations that deal with the aspirations, intimacies, and 
vulnerabilities of others) would itself be an exercise in practical rationality and could thereby be 
counted as intrinsically valuable. Pleasure and desire might then play an instrumental role in 
these relationships—that we may be more inclined to make a greater effort in our relationships 
insofar as we desire the good of the other person, or insofar as we enjoy their company and 
success.88 
 Nevertheless, the point remains: satisfaction and pleasure do not contribute to Hurka’s 
account of human perfection. Hurka acknowledges that perhaps some theory could be created 
                                                 
 
87 Ibid., 132-33. 
88 See ibid., 170. I take this to be a shortcoming in Hurka’s theory. To unfairly characterize only 
slightly, Hurka’s theory suggests that love is valuable only insofar as it requires brainpower, 
planning, and coordination. 
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that recognizes both perfection and satisfaction as goods; this kind of “hybrid” or “pluralistic” 
theory is of course quite possible. He says: 
My claim is not that satisfaction has no value. Pure perfectionism makes this claim, but 
there is also the possibility of a pluralist theory that weighs perfectionist ideas against 
others about, for example, pleasure or desire-fulfillment. Such a theory can combine 
these ideas in different ways. It can treat satisfaction as simply another value alongside 
perfection, or it can say that satisfaction has value only, or has the most value, when it is 
satisfaction in perfection, for example, pleasure in scientific research.89 
 
Such hybrid or pluralistic accounts will be discussed below. But it seems that any theory which 
accepts the importance of satisfaction or pleasure, at least according to Hurka, cannot be a pure 
perfectionistic theory—it must be some other kind of theory (i.e. an objective-list theory).  
 There is tension between this claim—that counting desire and pleasure as important is 
incompatible with pure perfectionism—and the claim that historically perfectionist accounts 
have adopted views of desire that are supposed to fit within a perfectionist framework. For 
example, Hurka mentions that philosophers like Aquinas say that humans have certain natural 
desires, quoting Aquinas’ passage that reads:  
Each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: 
thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of 
man, there is in every man an inclination to act according to reason.90 
 
                                                 
 
89 Ibid., 27-28. As we will see, I think perfectionism is capable of taking satisfaction into 
consideration, at least to a certain extent.  
90 Ibid., 25. quoting Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q.94, art. 3. I do not see why this 
needs to be an “accretion” to perfectionism. It may be more than Hurka finds necessary, but 
within the Thomistic analysis, such claims are part of the metaphysical framework that justifies 
perfectionism in the first place.  
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Hurka likewise acknowledges that pleasure has been invoked as an important concept within 
some accounts of perfectionism.91 But according to Hurka, such invocations of pleasure and 
desire “can only be accretions to perfectionism.”92 They obscure the real working of the theory 
and can cause confusion. Furthermore, Hurka believes it to simply be false that humans have 
natural inclinations towards reason and perfection, and that even if humans do typically enjoy 
their perfections (and perfecting activities) this is not always the case. Perfectionism would be 
best off if it were to reject such a view.93 Such accretions to perfectionism, Hurka asserts, divert 
attention from what is most important in perfectionism and invite needless objections.”94 Hurka 
describes, instead, a “non-teleological” form of perfectionism—one in which natural 
inclinations, natural desires, and natural ends play no real role in well-being and perfection.95  
 Thus we see no indication from Hurka that desire-satisfaction or pleasure—in 
themselves—have any place in human perfection. Rather, he seems to believe that insistence 
upon their importance is either evidence of a non-perfectionist theory or an unnecessary and 
helpful accretion to perfectionism. And while it’s true that an insistence upon the importance of 
desire-satisfaction and pleasure is unnecessary for perfectionism, it renders perfectionism more 
                                                 
 
91 Ibid., 26. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 27. Hurka gives an example of a research scientist who desires to advance knowledge, 
which she may never satisfy—but nevertheless she lives a good life. He also points out that “If a 
strong desire or pleasure doctrine were true, pursuing excellence would be easy. Once we knew 
where our greatest good lay, achieving it would be just a matter of following our strongest want 
or enjoying our greatest pleasure.”  
94 Ibid., 23. 
95 This apparently being a departure from Aristotle.  
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intuitively plausible. As I will argue, Aquinas’ view on pleasure and desire allow the Thomistic 
approach to withstand the objections raised above. 
B. Brink and the Kantian Approach 
Another of the leading theories of perfectionism is offered by David Brink, who channels 
Immanuel Kant and T. H. Green in his approach. Brink is wary of desire-based approaches to 
well-being, as he believes they lack the normative authority that prudential value ought to have. 
He instead prefers objectivism to subjectivism: “one might understand a person’s good in 
objective terms as consisting, for example, in the perfection of one’s essential (e.g. rational or 
deliberative) capacities or in some list of disparate objective goods (e.g. knowledge, beauty, 
achievement, friendship, or equality.”96 Of these two types of objectivist approaches, Brink 
prefers the first. He provides a few reasons. First, he points out that the second option (i.e. the 
objective-list theory) “may seem the only way to capture the variety of intrinsic goods.” The 
problem, however, is that “if it is a mere list of goods, with no unifying strands, it begins to look 
like a disorganized heap of goods.”97 More to it, he suggests that the objective-list account 
suffers from the same problem that does desire-satisfaction: it does not adequately account for 
well-being’s supposed normative authority, because the objective list theory cannot explain “why 
we should maintain our concern for items on the list if we already care about them and why we 
should care about items on the list if we do not yet.”98 
                                                 
 
96 Brink, "The Significance of Desire," 18. 
97 Ibid., 32.  
98 Ibid., 33. 
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 He avoids this “heap of goods” problem by adopting the second objectivist approach. He 
adopts a kind of perfectionism which “identifies a person’s good with the perfection of her 
nature and, in particular, with the development of her deliberative competence and the exercise 
of her capacities for practical deliberation.”99 Brink states the doctrine of perfectionism simply: 
“Perfectionists identify the good with perfecting one’s nature.”100 As a general rule, 
“perfectionist ideals often prize creative achievements that exercise the agent’s rational 
capacities in some way and condemn shallow and undemanding lives.”101 
 A key difference between Brink’s Kantianism and Hurka’s Aristotelianism is how they 
identify the relevant nature that is to be perfected. Hurka argues that it is human nature that ought 
to be perfected, keeping in mind that a human is a rational—but also biological—organism. 
Brink, on the other hand, focuses primarily on nature as rational agents; he grounds the standards 
of perfection not in contingent facts about our biological and psychological makeup, but in the 
nature of rational agency itself.102 
                                                 
 
99 Ibid., 32. 
100 Ibid., 33. This definition appears often throughout the literature, but I have my doubts about 
its appropriateness. It is not at all clear to me how one can go about perfecting his or her nature. 
One’s nature is a given, fixed thing—not the kind of thing to be perfected. Rather, I have always 
been under the impression that one’s nature generates the norms of prudential goodness and 
badness itself; thus one is better off perfecting himself in accordance with his nature, not 
“perfecting [his] nature.” Perhaps this is what is meant by the phrase, but if so, the phrasing 
could be improved.  
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. Scholars within the “New Natural Law” school often try to find a middle ground 
between traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic perfectionism and Kantian perfectionism; they argue 
that rationality, and not biology, generates the norms of well-being, but some of those norms 
involve bodily health, etc. See John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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 Brink finds this approach appealing because it preserves the “resonance condition”—i.e. 
that the good resonate with an individual for whom it is good—“without resort to problematic 
commitment to desire-dependence.”103 The fact that a creature has a certain biological makeup 
provides no claim of normative authority upon that creature, nor does the mere fact that the 
creature has a particular desire for something or other. Instead, the demands of practical reason 
generate both (1) normative authority and (2) resonance, insofar as we are rational creatures 
engaged in exercising our rationality. We cannot escape the demands of rationality, and 
rationality cannot fail to resonate with a rational creature (with any intent on exercising 
rationality). But the same cannot be said of biological essence; while we cannot escape our 
biological natures, we might not treat the imperatives of biological existence—reproduction, 
health, digestion, etc.—as normative—we may decide to forgo all of them completely. 
 Unlike philosophers within the Humean tradition, Brink does not see practical reason as 
simply an exercise in efficiently obtaining objects of desire. If practical reason does indeed have 
normative authority, practical reason must be more than the mere exercise of instrumental 
rationality. According to Brink, desire has no “per se authority,” and as such, desire cannot 
ground the normativity of practical reason.104 And while Brink says little about pleasure, one can 
assume that it likewise has no per se authority, and does not factor into an analysis of whether 
someone is exhibiting excellence in practical reason. Reasons, and not mere desire or pleasure, 
are and ought to be the starting point for practical reason. The ultimate upshot is that, under 
Brink’s neo-Kantian theory, pleasure and desire-satisfaction are of little to no import for well-
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being. Because practical rationality is the sole determiner of one’s well-being, and because 
pleasure and desire are only—at most—accidentally related to rationality, then Brink’s 
perfectionism fails to accommodate the intuitive goodness of both pleasure and desire 
satisfaction.  
C. Modifications and Hybrid Theories 
Someone therefore attracted to the idea that perfection is prudentially valuable must 
either accept the fact that certain intuitive goods like pleasure and desire-satisfaction are not, in 
fact, goods, or he must find a theory that counts perfection as good without neglecting the 
goodness of pleasure and satisfaction. For those who prefer the second option, the most obvious 
tactic would be to adopt instead an “objective list” theory that gives perfection a prominent place 
on the list of objective goods.105  This, one might think, provides the best of both worlds. We can 
still count perfection as good, but we can also call things like pleasure and desire-satisfaction 
good as well.  
Many contemporary philosophers have put forward various hybrid approaches, including 
William Lauinger and Robert Adams, both of whom add certain “desire-fulfillment” or 
“enjoyment” conditions onto perfectionist theories.106 Fred Feldman has entertained modified 
forms of hedonism that take into account the “worthiness” of certain pleasures.107 Antti 
                                                 
 
105 For more on why some theorists prefer objective-list theory over perfectionism, see, e.g., 
Arneson, "Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction."; Gwen Bradford, "Problems for 
Perfectionism," Utilitas 29, no. 3 (2017). 
106 Lauinger, Well-Being and Theism; Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework 
for Ethics. 
107 Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and 
Plausibility of Hedonism (New York: Clarendon Press, 2004). 
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Kauppinen proposes a hybrid form of perfectionism that takes into account the “shape of a 
life.”108 The basic idea that these theories share is that straightforward perfectionism is not 
enough to account for the intuitive goodness of desire-fulfillment, pleasure, or other activities not 
obviously geared towards self-perfection.  
I find much to like in these proposals, because they do point to shortcomings in some of 
the more popular perfectionistic theories within the literature. But at the end of the day, none of 
these hybrid accounts explains why the additional conditions required for intrinsic goodness—
e.g. desire-fulfillment, pleasure, shape of life, etc.—should count as intrinsically good for us. In 
most cases, they appeal to our intuitions, but do not provide any account of how these hybrid 
features connect with some notion of perfection or human nature. As such, the hybrid theories 
lack the explanatory unity that perfectionism is supposed to provide. And one of perfectionism’s 
chief strengths its explanatory unity: that the perfection of something just is what it means to be 
good for it. 
So whatever the merit of such theories may be, they are not perfectionist theories. But I 
believe that a perfectionist theory can indeed recognize the importance of both desire-satisfaction 
and pleasure. And indeed, I believe Thomas Aquinas has already laid out such a position; in the 
remaining pages, I will sketch out an interpretation of Aquinas’ theory such that desire-
satisfaction and pleasure can indeed be understood to be intrinsically good.   
IV. A Way Forward: Thomistic Perfectionism 
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We can thus see the problem for perfectionism. Insofar as pleasure and desire-satisfaction 
are (intuitively) intrinsically good for our well-being, perfectionism—as described above—
remains an implausible theory. To be sure, this does not prevent perfectionists from continuing to 
defend the theory, arguing (for example) that desire-satisfaction and pleasure are not all they’re 
cracked up to be. Nonetheless, if perfectionism is to find any wider appeal, there must be some 
way to account for the goodness of desire-satisfaction and pleasure—or at least some way to 
account for the intuition that they are good. 
 The perfectionist could, of course, argue that the satisfaction of certain desires would 
indeed be good for someone. For example, if one desired increased knowledge, or health, or 
practical wisdom, the perfectionist would happily admit that the attainment of such goods would 
benefit that person. But this is not sufficient to dispel the critiques of perfectionism. After all, it 
seems that the attainment of such goods is not good by virtue of the subject’s desires, but 
because such things are good in themselves. Such a modest admission on the part of the 
perfectionist would not make his theory any more accommodating of desire-satisfaction or 
pleasure; after all, the satisfaction of many other desires (e.g. immoral or frivolous desires) 
would not contribute to that person’s well-being. 
 What the perfectionist needs, then, is a way to incorporate the satisfaction of desire and 
the attainment of pleasure into the description of perfection itself. That is, unlike philosophers 
like Adams, Lauinger, Feldman, and others, the perfectionist must not simply add a pleasure or 
desire requirement to well-being. Rather, pleasure and desire satisfaction must be examples of, 
essential to, or—at very least—proper accidents of perfection itself. Under such a view, it cannot 
be objected that pleasure and satisfaction are not incorporated into the good—because they will 
be.  
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A. Aquinas’ Mechanics of Desire 
Ultimately, the goal of this argument is to show that desire and pleasure can be 
understood in terms of human perfection. And I believe that the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas 
does just that. However, it should be noted from the outset that Aquinas does not think that we 
can reach full perfection in this life.109 As such, any perfection that we talk about as attainable in 
this life—which is the primary focus of this paper—is only “perfection” in an analogical sense. 
They are relative perfections, they do not constitute perfection in the fullest sense of the term. I 
do not take this to be a major difficulty for Aquinas’ view, as I presume that most perfectionists 
share the view that we cannot actually achieve full human perfection in this life, and yet some 
things are indeed intrinsically good for us.  
 We should begin by examining Aquinas’ understanding of desire. Humans have various 
appetitive faculties—that is, certain aspects of our psychology draw us towards certain things.110 
The things towards which we are drawn are the objects of desire. For Aquinas, our appetitive 
faculties are drawn to these objects of desire because those objects appear (in some way or 
another) good to us.111 And while certain interpretations of this doctrine are controversial, it need 
not be so in this context. Aquinas does not mean that everything is desired because we believe it 
                                                 
 
109 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 48. 
110 Summa Theologica, I-II Q.5, art. 3. 
111 For a defense of the proposition that desire depends on appearances of the good, see Sergio 
Tenenbaum, Appearances of the Good : An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica : The Moral 
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to be good—an object of desire may strike our sub-rational sensitive faculties as good, contrary 
to our better judgment.112 
 An appetite is an inclination towards something—to some end or object proper to the 
appetitive faculty.113 Upon obtaining this end, the appetite is satisfied—the movement from 
desire to satisfaction is now complete. It is in this sense that the object of desire, as obtained by 
the agent, “perfects” or “completes” the appetite. The attainment of the object of desire is in thus 
perfective of the desiring faculty. As one Thomistic scholar put it: “goodness is understood in 
terms of desirability [and] desirability is understood in terms of completion.”114 
 Given the framework of Aquinas’ perfectionism, it is those inclinations that we have by 
virtue of human nature that direct us towards the objects and ends that fulfill us. Following 
Cicero, Aquinas argues that the “natural inclinations” or “natural appetites” of humans incline us 
towards the constitutive components of human happiness.115 The constitutive components of 
human happiness are grounded in our nature as human beings; certain things (or families of 
things) categorically “perfect” or “complete” these natural appetites. For example, humans—by 
                                                 
 
112 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II Q.77, art. 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 3-4. 
113 David Oderberg explains the Thomistic approach by saying that an appetite is simply a 
tendency or disposition towards or away from certain ends, and the term “good” can rightly be 
applied to all cases in which that appetite is fulfilled. That is—something is good to the extent 
that it fulfills an appetite. David Oderberg, "Being and Goodness," American Philosophical 
Quarterly 51, no. 4 (2014): 346-47. It is also worth noting that philosophers working within the 
Thomistic meta-ethical framework take as a given that goodness means “perfective of or 
fulfilling of the agent.” McInerny, Ethica Thomistica : The Moral Philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas, 2. 
114 Robert C. Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions : A Study of Summa Theologiae : 1a2ae 
22-48 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 17. 
115 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II Q.90, art. 2; Q.94, art. 2. 
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their animal nature—have an intrinsic desire for health and its components.116 By their rational 
nature, humans have an intrinsic desire for knowledge.117 These goods “perfect” aspects of our 
human nature—the body and mind, respectively. And it is precisely for this reason that we are 
inclined towards them.118 Perfection, for Aquinas, is not a matter of achieving certain goals that 
could potentially be alienating for the agent; it is a matter of satisfying the deepest desires of the 
individual according to the kind of thing he or she is. And as each constituent component of 
happiness—health, virtue, friendship, knowledge, etc.—is the fulfillment of these natural desires, 
they are “perfections” that ought to be sought. 
 Such an approach differs from objective-list theories insofar as it makes a claim about 
why certain things, when obtained, are good. It is not merely a brute fact that certain things are 
good for us (as the objective-list theorist maintains); rather, things are good for us because they 
are the proper objects of our natural inclinations.119 Such things perfect our faculties (this is why 
we tend to desire them), and it is therefore good for us when our desires for them are satisfied. 
                                                 
 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., I-II Q.8, art. 1; Q.2, art. 8. 
119 Finnis, for example, explains how our reasons for action are grounded in human perfection 
(whether we know it or not): “The goods to which practical reason’s first principles direct us are 
not abstract, ‘ideal’ or ‘quasi-Platonic forms.’ They are perfections, aspects of fulfillment, 
flourishing, completion, full-being, of the flesh-and-blood human beings (and the palpable 
human groups or communities) in whom they can be instantiated.” Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, 
Political, and Legal Theory, 91. 
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We would be worse off—less perfect—if we lacked such goods in our lives, and thus the 
satisfaction of our desires for such things is a necessary condition for perfection.120 
 This raises the following objection: doesn’t this describe an accidental relationship 
between desire-satisfaction and perfection? In other words—what makes something contribute to 
someone’s well-being? Is it the fact that the desired object or end perfects or fulfills some aspect 
of his or her human nature? Or is it the fact that the agent has this innate, natural inclination or 
desire towards it? If the former, it no longer seems that the perfectionist can continue to say that 
desire-satisfaction plays an important role in human well-being. 
  But Aquinas’ theory does not allow enough room for this objection to really take hold. 
We are inclined by our human nature (i.e. by our natural inclinations) towards certain things 
because they are the kinds of things that (by virtue of human nature) perfect or fulfill us (or at 
least our natural inclinations).121 It is a neat circle—one that I do not find terribly problematic, 
given Aquinas’ belief that a provident Creator has created human nature such that it is naturally 
inclined towards that which fulfills it.122 Some object or end can be good because it is desired 
(i.e. the object of our natural inclinations), and we are inclined towards it because it is good (i.e. 
it fulfills our natural inclinations). The upshot: things can be good for people, even within a 
traditional perfectionist theory of welfare, because they are the objects of our desires.  
                                                 
 
120 One might then ask what we are to make of the case in which someone fails to desire these 
objective goods. If these good things are nevertheless in his life, can they be good for him? 
Lauinger argues that such things cannot be good for someone absent desire. However, I would 
likely deny the premise: these are the things we cannot fail to desire in the relevant sense. I 
defend this view in a separate paper. 
121 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II Q.2; Q.8; Q.91, art. 2. 
122 Ibid., I-II Q.91, art.1; Q.93. 
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 Given Aquinas’ theory of human nature and perfectionism, we might easily see how 
things like vitality, family harmony, strong relationships, and philosophical knowledge might 
fulfill our natural inclinations. But this does not seem to account for the intuitive goodness of 
many other (perhaps “lesser”) things—a glass of beer, thirty minutes of peace and quiet, a trip to 
the amusement park, and the like. Even if Aquinas’ perfectionism recognizes the importance of 
desire-satisfaction in some contexts, the scope of this recognition seems rather limited. 
 There are two options. Someone defending Thomistic perfectionism might simply deny 
the intrinsic goodness of these lesser purported goods. If such things—a glass of beer, some 
peace and quiet, and amusement-park trips (pick your example)—are in fact valuable, they are 
only instrumentally so. Perhaps they give us an opportunity to recharge, to relax, and to energize 
ourselves so that we can then pursue intrinsic goods. But the Thomist cannot always rely on this 
option if he is to avoid the charge that perfectionism cannot acknowledge the goodness of “cheap 
thrills” and other lesser pleasures and (purported) goods. The other option, is therefore to provide 
an explanation of how, precisely, such lesser goods and cheap thrills can contribute to our well-
being within a perfectionist theory. That is, one must show that the purported goods somehow fit 
into a perfectionist framework—and here I gesture at how this might be accomplished given the 
framework outlined above. 
We should recall that perfectionist philosophers often disagree about what kinds of 
objects or activities perfect the kinds of beings that we are. There’s a whole host of possible 
things that could be plausibly argued perfect or fulfill us or our natural inclinations: life, vitality, 
food, drink, knowledge, play, beauty, friendship, practical reason, religion, leisure, marriage, and 
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so on.123 After all, such things are generally not sought for the sake of anything else. Moreover, 
most humans appear to share an inclination for such goods. This gives us at least prima facie 
grounds for believing that such things are, in fact, fulfilling and perfective of us.124 So the goal 
would be to show how any purported lesser good or cheap thrill—the glass of beer, the peace and 
quiet, the amusement-park visit—somehow instantiate some object of our natural inclinations. 
This, it seems to me, provides great flexibility to the perfectionist in accommodating a 
broad range of possible (though minor) intrinsic goods. If something can be counted as leisurely 
activity intelligibly done for its own sake, we can plausibly count it as an instance of intrinsic 
value. Likewise all the actions that we undertake for the sake of friends or sociability—even if 
it’s just a matter of getting a few drinks, going to the amusement park, or playing parchisi. A 
whole host of objects and activities could therefore be counted as intrinsically good under a 
particular theory of perfectionism.  
This at least makes some headway in showing that perfectionism needn’t deny the 
intrinsic goodness of many (or most) purported “lesser goods.” If a plausible perfectionist theory 
claims that “leisure” or “play” are proper objects of our natural inclinations, and a lesser good 
can fit under that rubric, then clearly perfectionism need not deny its intrinsic goodness.  
Nonetheless, one might continue to press the issue. What if there’s some purported lesser 
good that can’t be interpreted as instantiating some proper object of a natural inclination? 
                                                 
 
123 See, e.g., Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights; Murphy, Natural Law and Practical 
Rationality; Josef Pieper, Lesiure: The Basis of Culture (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2009); James 
V. Schall, On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2012). 
124 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. 
53 
 
 
Arneson, recall, describes cheap thrills as those activities that provide no value beyond their 
pleasantness.125 So even if we have partially addressed his concern—after all, the theory outlined 
above does not require effort, sacrifice, or significant talent for something to count as good—
Arneson might insist that there still might be intuitive goods that slip through the cracks of even 
this form of perfectionism.  
The perfectionist thus has two options. First, he could bite the bullet and simply deny that 
there are any such intrinsic goods that don’t fit under the “natural inclination” rubric. Second, he 
might provide a theory of human nature and/or of pleasure such that pleasure counts as a 
perfective good—at least to a certain degree.126 In what follows, I will sketch out how the 
Thomistic framework allows for the second option.  
B. Pleasure as Perfection 
Aquinas does not deny the goodness of pleasure. In fact, he considers pleasure to be good 
for its own sake. As a perfectionist, then, Aquinas must explain how pleasure is perfective. The 
starting point is Aristotle’s account of pleasure, whereby pleasure is the “natural consequence of 
any operation perfect in its kind.”127 Pleasure, under this account, is a property (in the 
Aristotelian sense, i.e. “proper accident”) of perfection.128 A property—even a proper accident—
                                                 
 
125 Arneson, "Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction," 120. 
126 It is not only theoretically possible for pleasure to be considered a good within 
perfectionism—such views have been defended throughout the history of philosophy. The 
ancient Epicureans believed pleasure to be good precisely because of the kinds of beings we are. 
Modern philosophers have arguably made the same argument. Dale Dorsey, "Objectivity and 
Perfection in Hume's Hedonism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 53, no. 2 (2015). 
127 Garrigou-Lagrange, Beatitude: A Commentary on St. Thomas' Theological Summa, Ia Iiae, 
Qq. 1-54, 68. 
128 Henri Renard, The Philosophy of Morality (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1953), 42. 
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need not always be present. After all, a three-legged dog is still a dog, even if four-leggedness is 
a property of dog-ness. It is in this sense that “pleasure does not constitute man’s happiness, but 
is something added to it.”129  
The non-essential nature of pleasure does not negate its intrinsic goodness. Pleasure is 
“good simply, is good in itself.”130 Of course, Aquinas acknowledges that certain circumstances 
may make it so that experiencing pleasure might be all-things-considered bad, morally 
dangerous, or simply “unsuitable.”131 Nonetheless, he takes the position that, on top of the 
realization of some perceived good—i.e. some perceived perfection or fulfillment—“there is 
added another good, which is pleasure.”132 This is because pleasure itself is an additional kind of 
perfection or fulfillment. Pleasure is how we subjectively experience the completion of an 
operation, movement, or inclination when recognized or perceived as such.133 It is “the emotional 
response to a present [perceived] good,” which itself “perfects” the activity, operation, or 
inclination.134 In other words, “pleasure perfects activity by way of final cause.”135 It is the 
subjective, experienced end towards which an inclination, operation, or activity is directed.  
                                                 
 
129 Charles Reutemann, The Thomistic Concept of Pleasure (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1953), 21. From Aquinas himself: “That men desire pleasure for its 
own sake, and not for the sake of something else, [is] not enough to indicate the pleasure is the 
ultimate end . . . . for although pleasure is not the ultimate end, it is, of course, a concomitant of 
this end, since pleasure arises out of the attainment of the end.” Aquinas, Summa Contra 
Gentiles, III, 26.19. 
130 Summa Theologica, I-II Q.34, art. 2. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., I-II Q.32, art. 1. 
134 Ibid., I-II Q.31, art. 1; Renard, The Philosophy of Morality, 40. 
135 Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 181. 
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The result is an account of pleasure that treats pleasure non-instrumentally good. And 
while its goodness is derivative of (perceived) objective goodness, it does not follow that 
pleasure does not intrinsically improve human well-being.136 Aquinas, therefore, can maintain 
his perfectionist theory while claiming that “pain attacks the general well-being of the organism, 
whereas pleasure merely increases that well-being.”137 Experiencing pleasure may not always be 
morally good, nor will it always yield a net improvement in one’s well-being (since one might 
take pleasure in harmful things, and since one’s moral rectitude is arguably part of one’s well-
being). As one scholar notes:  
Inasmuch as pleasure is an actuality or perfection, it is obviously good in the being of 
nature; but it is not immediately apparent as to whether all pleasure is morally good, that 
is, in conformity with reason . . . It will derive its [moral] goodness or badness from the 
activity [which] it completes.138 
 
Pleasure may be intrinsically good—but it is not the good.139 Thus the Thomist can indeed 
affirm, with Arneson, that if pleasure did not count as intrinsically good, “the world would be 
immensely worse and most human lives significantly blighted.”140 Thus the Thomistic approach 
                                                 
 
136 To use an analogy: A piano string is tuned to a certain key. If nothing obstructs the 
reverberation of the string after the hammer strikes it, a sound is produced. The sound attends—
as a proper accident—the string’s reverberation. All has gone well—we might say that the sound 
was successfully played. And to that extent, things are good. The string’s object—to create a 
sound—has been realized and fulfilled. But it does not follow from this that, within the context 
of the piece of music being played, the note played was a good one. The string could have been 
tuned incorrectly—or perhaps the musician struck the wrong key. All the same, a note was 
successfully played, and the end—or good—of the string (as it was tuned at the time) was 
realized. Likewise, pleasure—considered in itself—is good, but experiencing pleasure might not 
always yield a net improvement in someone’s well-being.  
137 Reutemann, The Thomistic Concept of Pleasure, 11. 
138 Ibid., 19. 
139 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 27. 
140 Arneson, "Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction," 120. 
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to perfectionism can accommodate the claim that, all things being equal, a pleasant life is better 
than an unpleasant one.  
 So how might Thomistic perfectionism take on Arenson’s “cheap thrills”? Even if that 
cheap thrill does not instantiate some proper object of a natural inclination, nevertheless the 
pleasure that the cheap thrill produces is nonetheless intrinsically good. Moreover, the pleasure is 
good precisely because it is a kind of perfection: it is the subjective experience of the objective 
completion or fulfillment of some activity, operation, or inclination. And again, none of this 
suggests that an instance of pleasure experienced in a “cheap thrill” ought to be pursued in any 
given situation—after all, doing so might be (at least in some cases) morally suspect or all-
things-considered prudentially bad. Some substantive theory of practical reasonability or 
morality would govern whether someone ought (all things considered) to pursue a particular 
cheap thrill, but the cheap thrill (or at least the pleasure gained from it) would nonetheless still be 
good for the agent.  
V. Conclusion 
The conclusion, then, is that perfectionism can indeed affirm the importance of desire-
satisfaction and pleasure. The perfectionist may consistently hold that desire-satisfaction is a 
necessary condition of perfection. To be perfect is to be without want—and our deepest wants, 
which would result in the most satisfaction—are for those objective goods which perfect our 
faculties. When we are morally, spiritually, and physically healthy, we experience the enjoyment 
of those goods, and this enjoyment is—like the rosy glow of youth—a property, proper but non-
essential to the good it attends that makes our lives better. After all, pleasure is the subjective 
experience of the perfection of a faculty’s operation.  
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Perfectionism, thus, can rebut one of its primary attacks against it: it does not deny the 
importance of desire-satisfaction and pleasure within the good life. In fact, it can positively 
affirm their goodness—within certain limits. Pleasure is not the good—nor is any created or 
temporary object that gives satisfaction the good. But it does not follow from this that pleasure 
and desire-satisfaction are unimportant. The goodness of pleasure is perfectly consistent with the 
claim that human perfection (in full) does not consist in pleasure or any other created good. 
Aquinas recapitulates Augustine’s famous dictum about the restless human heart: 
For man to rest content [an effect of perfection] with any created good is not possible, for 
he can be happy only with complete good which satisfies his desire altogether [i.e. which 
perfects him]: he would not have reached his ultimate end were there something still 
remaining to be desired.141 
 
Far from neglecting the importance of desire, Aquinas ensures that desire plays a key role in his 
account of human perfection. The goods that partially or temporarily give rest to the inclinations 
of the soul are indeed perfective to the extent that they do satisfy our longing; but insofar as they 
fail to satisfy our highest longing (according to Aquinas, for the fullness of Truth and Goodness, 
the proper objects of our reason and will, respectively), our pursuit of such lesser goods cannot 
bring us the fullness of perfection. And, per Christian doctrine, grace perfects nature; any defect 
or imperfection in one’s life (for surely there will be many) can be overcome by the 
superabundance of God’s grace; this why it is consistent for someone like Aquinas to (1) affirm 
                                                 
 
141 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q.2, art. 8. 
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the intrinsic goodness of pleasure142 and thus (2) accept that pleasure is a kind of perfection143 
while simultaneously (3) claiming that pleasure is not fully perfective of human life.144 
This is not an argument about semantics. Perhaps some people will read Aquinas and 
simply deny that he is a perfectionist, since he affirms the importance of desire-satisfaction and 
pleasure. But we should not forget that Aquinas (probably) talks about perfection more than any 
other philosopher, and explicitly considers perfection to be the ultimate end and good of man. It 
would be quite odd to exclude such a figure from discussions of perfectionism—especially on 
the grounds that he has a different conception of perfection than certain contemporary 
philosophers. Second, perhaps my definition of perfectionism is a little revisionary. But perhaps 
such revision is needed when certain key figures in the history of philosophy are excluded from a 
particular philosophical conversation because later philosophers define their terms in ways that 
don’t easily map onto older schools of thought. It would be unfortunate if certain scholars 
prematurely dismissed perfectionism as a viable theory of well-being because they conflate 
perfectionism—a general family of theories articulated by various philosophers throughout 
history—with a very narrow set of theories presented by contemporary philosophers.  
 
  
                                                 
 
142 Ibid., I, Q.5, art. 6. 
143 Ibid., I-II, Q.31-34. 
144 Ibid., I-II, Q.2, art.6. 
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Paper 3: The Singular Analysis of the “Good For” Relation 
I. Introduction 
Well-being, it is often said, is a measurement of how well one’s life is going. When we 
talk about well-being, we talk about what is “good for” someone, or “someone’s good.” There is 
a relation between the person and the good, and if we are to have a better grasp of well-being, we 
need a better grasp of this relation. An essential step in understanding what is good for ourselves 
and the people we care about (and, for that matter, people we don’t care about) is articulating the 
nature of this “good-for” relation—or, to use the language of Peter Railton and Connie Rosati, 
we need to better understand “relational goodness.”145  
In recent decades, philosophers have argued about whether relational good—i.e. the 
“good-for” relation—is a singular kind of value.146 When we talk about what is good for persons, 
what is good for plants, what is good for cars, and so forth, are we employing the same concept 
in each case? Or, alternatively, are we employing different “good-for” relations? Rosati frames 
the question in the following way: 
Is relational good—good for—a singular kind of value? If so, how does its singularity 
affect what we might plausibly say about the relationship between the fact that X is good 
for S and the existence of normative reasons to do or promote or use or foster X? Does 
‘good for’ instead express a number of different relations, depending upon the type of 
usage, and so different sorts of relational value? If so, then how many distinct sorts of 
relational value are there? And what distinguishes those uses of ‘good for’ that concern 
                                                 
 
145 See Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," The Philosophical Review 95, no. 2 (1986): 330; Connie 
S. Rosati, "Objectivism and Relational Good," Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (2008). 
146 Some philosophers (most notably G. E. Moore) reject talk of “good for” altogether. I will not 
investigate arguments for this position within this paper. 
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welfare? More specifically, what distinguishes the form of relational value that 
constitutes personal good or prudential value—good for a person?147 
 
The question is whether all right predications of “X is good for S,” including within the context 
of well-being, all share the same basic meaning. Rosati calls this the “multiplicity problem,” and 
argues that how we answer the question (i.e. is there an analysis of the “good-for” predicate that 
can apply to all cases?) has a direct effect on our efforts to construct theories of welfare.148 The 
reasoning is rather straightforward: if relational goodness is a singular value—that is, if all right 
predications of “good-for” share the same meaning—then many theories of welfare “will be 
deficient to the extent that the analyses they offer of the good-for relation fails to capture parts of 
our talk.”149 After all, many analyses of well-being are incompatible with “good-for” 
predications made of non-human, or at least non-sensate, subjects.150 On the other hand, if indeed 
“good for” does not express a single relation, then any attempt to build a theory on the 
supposition that it does may result in “severe distortion.”151 
                                                 
 
147 Connie S. Rosati, "Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem," Philosophical Issues 19, 
no. 1 (2009): 206. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Take, for example, the theory offered by L.W. Sumner. If well-being is necessarily 
perspectival (as a conceptual matter), then it is hard to see how “good for” in the welfare context 
can have the same meaning as “good for” when applying it to something without a perspective—
for example, a car, or a project, etc. See Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Likewise, 
Peter Railton appears to argue that relational goodness (of the sort he’s interested in) can only 
apply to beings with the capacity for motivation—clearly, this good-for relation is inapplicable to 
plants, cars, and other things that have no motivation. See Railton, "Moral Realism." 
151 Take, for example, the theory offered by Richard Kraut. If well-being is derived from a 
different kind of relational goodness, conceptually distinct from other good-for relations, then 
why should we assume that there must be some analogy between, say, what is good for humans 
and what is good for plants? Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, 4. 
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 Neither side’s position is immediately implausible. Clearly a singular analysis that could 
unify all of our predications of relational good is more theoretically elegant and therefore more 
appealing. Its virtue lies in its simplicity. As Guy Fletcher writes, “It would be a major selling 
point of a theory if it could solve this ‘multiplicity problem’ by giving a unified treatment of our 
use of “good for” across all subjects.”152  
 Richard Kraut, in What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, argues for this kind 
of singular analysis: 
It makes sense to say about certain conditions that they are good for plants but bad for 
humans, and when we say this we are talking about one and the same relationship; what 
we mean is that a single thing bears that good-for relationship to plants but does not bear 
that same good-for relationship to humans…. But the meaning of the expression “good 
for” does not alter. The relata are different; the relationship is the same.153 
 
The advocate for a singular analysis would hold that when we talk about flourishing being good 
for plants and (say) pleasure being good for humans, we are making the same predication. That 
is, there is no reason to think that we are employing two different concepts—i.e. speaking 
equivocally—in the two cases. The singular analysis view, therefore, holds that we do not use the 
term “good-for” equivocally when talking about what’s good for different kinds of things.  
 Several philosophers, including Rosati, have argued against the possibility of a singular 
analysis of relational good. They have argued that “good-for” is used equivocally within various 
linguistic contexts; they argue that there are multiple good-for relations that cannot be reduced to 
a singular analysis. In this paper, I will defend the singular analysis of relational good from 
                                                 
 
152 Guy Fletcher, "The Locative Analysis of Good for Formulated and Defended," Journal of 
Ethics & Social Philosophy  (2011): 10. 
153 Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, 94. 
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recent attacks. My approach will be loosely grounded on the ethical and metaphysical theory of 
Thomas Aquinas. I argue that Aquinas provides a framework in which we can understand all 
claims of relational good—regardless of whether the subject of the predication is a person, an 
animal, a plant, or an artifact. That is, Aquinas defends something like a singular analysis of 
relational good.154 I will offer the Thomistic analysis, and then will demonstrate that the 
Thomistic analysis avoids the arguments raised by critics of the singular analysis, such as Connie 
Rosati, Jeff Behrends, and Guy Fletcher.   
II. The Multiplicity Problem 
A. Rosati’s Challenge: Accommodating Various “Good-For” Predications 
 In What is Good and Why, Richard Kraut articulates a theory of welfare that is grounded 
on a singular understanding of the “good-for” relation. This approach to relational goodness 
serves as the structure for the view he called “developmentalism,” means that things are good or 
bad for something insofar as they promote or hinder flourishing. He offers a quick sketch of how 
he understands the “good-for” relation by saying that 
everything that is good for S, whether S is living or not, either promotes or is part of 
flourishing.155 
 
Despite this claim, Rosati argues that Kraut often equivocates between different uses of the 
relational good. Throughout Kraut’s book, he uses the phrase “good for” in three separate ways:  
 (1) X is good for S = X is in S’s interest (or where S’s interest lies). 
 (2) X is good for S = X is suitable for S in that it serves S well. 
                                                 
 
154 I say “something like,” because Aquinas’ approach relies on analogous predication, which 
permits a certain amount of variation of meaning in the same linguistic expression, but not so 
much that two analogous predications are equivocal.   
155 Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, 132. 
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(3) X is good for S = the occurrence of X is productive of or part of S’s flourishing.156 
 
Rosati points out that none of these formulations seem to be equivalent to one another; they seem 
to each express a different idea.157 As such, it is difficult to see how relational good can be a 
singular value. The phrase “good for” in the sentence “boots are good for walking” seems to 
have the second meaning, not the first and third. Arguably, the phrase “sunlight is good for 
plants” employs the third meaning of good-for, not the first. So it seems that, despite Kraut’s 
insistence upon a singular meaning of the good-for relation, he too necessarily uses the term 
equivocally. Rosati forces Kraut into a dilemma: Kraut may either accept one of the three 
analyses as fundamental, in which case much of our “good for” talk will go unaccounted for, or 
Kraut may accept all three analyses as distinct and irreducible, in which case he accepts a 
multiplicity of good-for relations—in other words, he must give up his singular analysis (and 
quite probably, his theory of well-being founded upon it). 
 A singular analysis of relational good must be able to unify the apparent multiplicity of 
its use. In particular, it must accommodate what Rosati claims are five different “good-for” 
relations: 
1. Instrumentally good for: X is good for S in that X is effective as a means to S 
                                                 
 
156 Rosati, "Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem," 212. Rosati points to the following 
passages in What is Good and Why. First, Kraut says on page 1: “When followed by the 
preposition ‘for’ or ‘of,’ [the word ‘good’] purports to tell us where our interests lie.” On page 
87, Kraut claims that the “‘for’ in ‘G is good for S’ is best taken to indicate that G has a certain 
kind of suitability to S . . . . ‘suitable for’ is the sense of ‘good for’ in which boots are good for 
walking, spoons are good for stirring, watches are good for telling time.” Finally, on page 141, 
Kraut argues that “when it is good for S that P, that is because the occurrence of P is productive 
or part of flourishing.” Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being. 
157 Rosati, "Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem," 212. 
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2. Good for a use value: X is good for S in that X is something it is rational to want or 
secure in relation to S, considering just what an S is for 
3. Good for an intrinsic value: X is good for S in that X helps to preserve or enhance S as 
the valuable item that it is 
4. Good for a living thing: X is good for S in that X promotes the life, growth, health, or 
reproductive success of S 
5. Good for a welfare subject: X is good for S in that X intrinsically or noninstrumentally 
benefits S.158 
 
On Rosati’s interpretation of What is Good and Why, Kraut’s project of grounding welfare 
theory on a singular analysis fails. Whether or not her interpretation is accurate may be set aside 
for the purposes of this paper. The point stands: a singular analysis of relational good must be 
able to accommodate a wide variety of predications of the “good-for” relation. Insofar as there 
are correct predications of relational goodness that a singular analysis cannot account for, the 
singular analysis is deficient. I argue, however, that the Thomistic analysis can indeed 
accommodate each of the various uses of “good for” proposed by Rosati; it is not deficient in this 
respect. 
B. Behrends’ Challenge: The Limitations of Flourishing  
 Setting aside Rosati’s arguments about Kraut’s equivocation, Kraut maintains that all 
right predications of relational good can be analyzed in terms of flourishing.159 The view that 
flourishing stands as the ultimate good of all living things has a long pedigree; it is common to 
translate and interpret Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in this manner. Kraut provides insight into 
the importance of this concept: 
                                                 
 
158 Ibid., 206. Rosati provides here analysis of each purportedly distinct good-for relation. As I 
will later argue, a singular analysis can accommodate all of these.  
159 Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, 132-33. 
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It is striking that we have a single term—“flourishing”—that we use to evaluate how well 
any living thing is doing. For most living things, to flourish is simply to be healthy: to be 
an organism that is unimpeded in its growth and normal functioning…. Could it be that 
the notion of flourishing is involved in the very idea of what is good for a living 
organism? That the things that are good for us human beings are the ones that play a role 
in our living flourishing lives—lives that go well for us in a way that is comparable to the 
way the lives of other sorts of creatures go well for them? That, at any rate, is the 
hypothesis that will be explored in this study.160 
 
Kraut’s singular analysis thus supposes that the good of all living things is ultimately reducible 
to the single concept of flourishing, whether those living things are peonies, puppies, or people. 
Kraut is not alone in this line of thinking. Philippa Foot, for example, in Natural Goodness, 
makes a similar claim:  
The concept of a good human life plays the same part in determining goodness of human 
characteristics and operations that the concept of flourishing plays in the determination of 
goodness in plants and animals.161 
 
The idea of flourishing as the ultimate good for living things has intuitive appeal. But we must 
first be clear on what we mean by flourishing. As Rosati notes, the term “flourishing” within 
moral philosophy and the study of well-being is often used in two distinct ways.162 The first 
occurs when “flourishing” is used as a synonym of “good for” or “welfare” or “well-being.” In 
this case, claims such as “flourishing is intrinsically good for an organism” would be circular and 
unhelpful. The second use of “flourishing,” on the other hand, denotes what Rosati calls “a 
naturalistic and substantive state or condition of S, a condition that includes such things as the 
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development of characteristic capacities, healthiness, and normal functioning.”163 It seems to be 
this sense of the word that is at the heart of Kraut’s analysis. 
 The problem with this view, however, is that Kraut’s hypothesis about the importance of 
flourishing has little explanatory power when it comes to explaining how things can be good or 
bad for inanimate objects. When we say “oil is good for cars,” are we merely using the “good 
for” phrase metaphorically (or equivocally), in which case oil is not really good for cars? To put 
it within the framework of Kraut’s developmentalism: is it true that oil helps the car develop in 
some important way? 
 Jeff Behrends notes that this is a major difficulty for Kraut’s theory. Kraut states that 
“everything that is good for S, whether S is living or not, either promotes or is part of 
flourishing.”164 This suggests that “what is good for an artifact like a car is what promotes 
flourishing—not the flourishing of the car of course (since there is no such thing), but the 
flourishing of human beings.”165 There are a few problems with this approach. One of them is 
pointed out by Rosati, who says that  
if the good for an artifact or kind looks to something beyond itself, whereas the good for 
us or for other living things does not, that would again strongly hint that a different 
relation is being expressed in talk about what is good for, say, an artifact, and what is 
good for us.166  
 
Kraut does not provide an explanation of why this would not a problem for his view (though, as I 
will suggest below, I think it could be done). But let briefly consider Kraut’s claim that the good-
                                                 
 
163 Ibid. 
164 Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, 132. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Rosati, "Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem," 219-20. 
67 
 
 
for relation is always, ultimately, directed towards flourishing—that X is good for an artifact 
only if X helps the artifact promote flourishing. Behrends points out that this theory falls to an 
obvious counter-example. What about those artifacts whose purpose it is to promote 
unflourishing? He gives an example of a machine, programmed for destruction—its purpose and 
function is to maximize unflourishing.167 This machine runs on batteries; it seems intuitive to say 
that batteries would be good for such a machine. But if this is so, Kraut’s claim about what is 
good for artifacts is mistaken—how can batteries be good for this “terror machine” if these 
batteries will only hinder, and perhaps destroy, all forms of flourishing? Behrends argues instead 
for a rather standard, straightforward understanding of the good-for relation with respect to 
artifacts: “something is good for an artifact if and only if, and because, it contributes to one of 
the functions of the artifact.”168 This seems quite intuitive; few would disagree. But if it is true 
that batteries are good for the terror machine, then it seems difficult to say that the all good-for 
relations have a positive relation to flourishing. In Behrends’ words, “the fact that things can be 
good for the terror machine shows that no version of the developmentalist analysis can vindicate 
Kraut’s unified analysis thesis.”169 
 The singular analysis view, therefore, is faced with a second challenge, in addition to the 
challenge put forth by Rosati mentioned above: it must not entail that all good-for relations bear 
a positive relation to flourishing, as this results in absurdities—that batteries are not good for 
Behrends’ “terror machine,” that proper programming is not good for nuclear weapons, etc. 
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C. Fletcher’s Challenge: Avoiding Substantive Perfectionism  
 A further challenge raised by critics of singular-analysis views concerns the relationship 
between analyses of relational goodness and certain substantive theories of the good. For 
example, Guy Fletcher argues that singular analyses of relational good often entail a certain 
controversial relationship between relational and attributive goodness. 
 Fletcher identifies at least one singular analysis of relational good that he finds 
problematic. In particular, he examines an analysis of relational good often associated with forms 
of Aristotelian perfectionism:  
What is good for a K is that which is a (productive or constituent) means to its becoming, 
or remaining, an attributively good K.170 
 
This seems to imply that the ultimate good for anything of kind K is being an attributively good 
K; variations of this thesis can be found in the works of many philosophers. In the opening pages 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that all activity is undertaken for the sake of some 
good—that is, that every agent seeks what is good for it. He follows this with the claim that what 
is good for that agent is the excellent performance of its characteristic activity. Thus we have a 
very quick move from a singular analysis of the good to a substantive theory of the good—one 
bound up in notions of virtue and the like.171 
 Fletcher, in reference to the above thesis (that what is intrinsically good for something is 
its being an attributively good member of its kind), states that  
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[This analysis gets] the right answers in [some] cases. To be good for a string quartet just 
is to be something that contributes towards making it, or preserving it, as a good (or 
better) string quartet. And to be bad for a sunset just is to be something that in some way 
contributes towards making it a bad (or worse) sunset. And this same analysis works for 
all the cases mentioned above, such as gas tanks, bicycles, watches, etc.172 
 
The objection, however, is that this does not seem to hold with for all subjects—especially for 
subjects that we typically think of as subjects of well-being. According to Fletcher: 
While it is true that to be good for an artwork just is to be conducive to its becoming or 
remaining a good artwork, the relation of being good for a person is not that of being 
conducive to their becoming or remaining a good person.  Pleasure might be good for me 
without making me any more (or less) virtuous, for example, and the same goes for other 
welfare subjects. It is clear that some things are good or bad for gorillas, but these things 
do not seem to be that which conduces to making them good gorillas, whatever that 
might be. Thus this new unified proposal—that of treating all “good for” talk as 
connected to attributive goodness—will not work.173 
 
Fletcher’s complaint is that singular analyses of relational good often create an implausibly 
strong link between relational good and attributive good. A conceptual analysis of relational 
good, one might argue, should not immediately entail some substantive account of the good—
such as Aristotelian perfectionism.  
 This is not to say that an analysis of relational good that entailed substantive claims about 
the good is necessarily wrong—it could be that the concept of relational goodness, properly 
understood, does entail such substantive claims. But this is not how most welfare theorists 
understand the concept; I venture to guess that most welfare theorists want the concept to remain 
open, so that we can engage in debate about what the correct substantive theory of relational 
goodness (or welfare, etc.) actually is. If an analysis of relational good necessarily excludes 
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pleasures, desire-satisfaction, and “cheap thrills” from being good for us as humans, we seem to 
have some reason to reject the analysis—for we tend to believe that the correct theory of 
relational good is a matter of substantive, not conceptual, debate.  
 This, therefore, is another challenge for any singular analysis of relational good: it should 
not exclude analytically from human well-being the possibility of any of the main contenders for 
the correct theory of the good: perfectionism, hedonism, desire-satisfactionism, judgment 
subjectivism, objective-list-ism, etc. Now this is a less critical test than the previous two, because 
it is possible that certain theories of well-being are so conceptually misguided that they should be 
excluded from discussion analytically. But such an approach would be quite revisionary, and I do 
not attempt to defend such a position here.  
III. A New (Old) Analysis of Relational Good 
 Thus far, we have seen how certain singular analyses might fail. Rosati, Fletcher, and 
Behrends together present three hurdles that a singular analysis of the “good for” relation must 
jump: it must (1) accommodate the many different contexts in which the phrase “good-for” is 
used, (2) acknowledge that artifacts are not necessarily directed towards the flourishing of living 
things, and (3) avoid excluding (analytically) certain substantive theories of well-being. The 
following analysis is intended to meet each of these requirements. 
 The analysis is influenced by the Thomistic tradition of value theory, which is in turn 
influenced by that of Aristotle. (I was taken aback when Rosati claimed that singular analyses of 
relational good were “quite new,” when in fact they can be traced back at least to Plato, who 
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maintained that all instances of goodness participate in the form of the Good.174 This—to my 
mind at least—makes it quite old.) The central idea is that while we can still meaningfully 
categorize different kinds of good, there must be something that they all have in common insofar 
as they all belong to the same genus, namely “goodness.”175 
A. The Thomistic Analysis 
 For Aquinas, goodness is primarily captured by the idea of perfection. To borrow from 
David Oderberg, Aquinas is primarily focused on goodness as “perfection, where this term is 
taken in its etymological sense of ‘completion’ or fulfillment,’ with correlative connotations such 
as ‘improve’ or ‘bring to the highest available standard.’”176 This perfection, however, is not to 
be understood in absolute terms, but only relative to the thing or act being perfected: “an object 
is completed when one of its potencies is actualized, for example by manifesting a 
disposition.”177 Things are good insofar as they achieve perfection or fulfillment in this sense. 
 Aquinas notes that something is good insofar as it is desirable; that is, insofar as it 
fulfills—perfects, completes, satisfies—some inclination or appetite.178 We must be careful, 
however, because by saying this Aquinas is not (exclusively) referring to subjective, conative 
attitudes or mental states. Rather, everything—whether animate or inanimate, rational or 
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arational—is “inclined by a certain natural inclination towards their ends.”179 This includes, but 
is not limited to, the ends that we are consciously inclined towards as sensate, rational beings. It 
is entirely possible for something to have an end without it being aware of it; in fact—under the 
Thomistic approach—this is quite common.180 
 It is in this sense that Aquinas employs the term “end” when speaking of goodness. An 
end is a final cause, and final causality can be rightly attributed to many things beyond mere 
human action. Thus we see the basis for a conclusion that Aquinas reaches early in the Summa 
Theologica, that “goodness implies the aspect of an end.”181 The context demonstrates that 
Aquinas is not talking about ends in a conative sense; he is talking about the fulness of actuality, 
the perfection, or the fulfillment of some being, movement, or activity. 
 Things are good, with respect to the kinds of things they are—i.e. their form or “formal 
cause”—insofar as they are perfect, complete, actual.182 The lives of all organisms and the 
functions of all artifacts are directed towards their respective perfections, the fullness of actuality 
proper to their respective formal causes. For artifacts, the formal cause is given by something 
extrinsic to the artifact; for natural objects, the formal cause is intrinsic to the thing itself. This 
perfection, completion, or fullness of actuality is the end towards which the subject, qua the kind 
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of thing that it is, is directed.183 According to Anthony Lisska’s translation, “all things found to 
have the criterion of an end at the same time meet the criterion of a good.”184  That is, all cases of 
goodness—and therefore all cases of relational goodness—have the aspect of a final cause.  
 This line of reasoning provides the basis for the Thomistic analysis of relational good. 
The analysis is simple and straightforward:185 
Thomistic Analysis of Relational Good: X is good for S insofar as X is an end of S.186 
For this to make sense, we must understand an end not as some consciously-desired object or 
state-of-affairs, but as the fulfillment of a potency, the completion of some inclination, the 
fulfillment of some tendency or appetite. 
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 We can see how this analysis fits with a few of our intuitions about intrinsic goodness. 
(Aquinas’s distinction between “befitting” and “useful” goods roughly tracks the distinction 
between intrinsic and instrumental goodness.187) What is intrinsically good for something (or 
some activity or movement) is what fulfills or perfects the thing (or activity or movement) as 
such.188 It is here that we might say that flourishing (or a particular substantive description of 
flourishing) is good for a tree; the tree, as the kind of thing it is, has as its final cause—its 
completion, its perfection—its own flourishing. We can say the same about humans; whatever it 
is that fulfills us, that perfects us as humans is intrinsically good for us.189 We might, like Kraut, 
call this flourishing; we don’t have to. No substantive claim about what fulfills or perfects 
humans necessarily follows from this analysis—our intrinsic good might lie in the objects (and 
realization) of our basic desires, the experience of pleasure, or rational excellence. The point is 
that, for X to be intrinsically good for S, X must be an end—fulfilling or completing—of S to at 
least some degree. 
 How, then, should we understand conscious desires? As rational agents, we have ends 
that we seek. Under the Thomistic doctrine, are all of them good for us? After all, if X is good 
for S insofar as X is an end, wouldn’t that render all consciously-desired ends good? This seems 
implausible—after all, someone could pursue, as an end, self-harm or harm of others. Are we to 
treat such ends as good? Yes and no. Take, for example, someone who desires to self-harm. It is 
true that the end being sought is self-harm. Thus, the object—self-harm—is the perfection, the 
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fulfillment of that desire. The appetite—the inclination towards self-harm—is completed in the 
act of self-harm. Thus, the “good of the desire” is self-harm. But it does not follow from this that 
self-harm is good for the agent seeking it, or that it ought to be sought in the first place. For self-
harm to be good for the agent (in the sense above), it must to some degree bring to fulfillment, 
perfection, or completion the agent, not merely one of his desires.190 As fallible, rational agents, 
our desires (and their respective ends) can come out-of-line with our ultimate end the kind of 
beings we are.191 So this is no objection to Aquinas’ theory; it simply means that we must 
distinguish between the “good” (i.e. the end, perfection, or fulfillment) of desires and the agents 
that have them. 
  The above analysis may also apply to instrumental goodness as well. When we reflect 
upon human action, we recognize that we have many ends that do not fully satisfy, complete, or 
perfect us (or our activities/projects). And yet we rightly desire them insofar as they are 
instrumental for the attainment of some further end. Aquinas recognizes such instrumental goods 
as “relative” ends.192 That is, they are ends sought for the sake of further ends, from which they 
derive their goodness. Again, these instrumental goods need not be consciously sought by the 
subject; rather, they must simply be instrumentally necessary or expedient for the realization of 
other ends. And so while instrumental goods are not ends in an absolute sense, they are ends 
nonetheless; they perfect or fulfill an inclination to the extent that they bring the inclination 
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closer to its fulfillment and realization. Thus acquiring money might be instrumentally good for 
us, insofar as it is desired for the sake of something intrinsically good for us.193 
 Aquinas, of course, recognizes that the import of the “good for” predication will differ, 
depending on what it is predicated of. While all relational goodness is grounded in final 
causality, the kinds of things that will count as good will differ, depending on what the subject of 
the predication is. There are important metaphysical distinctions between, say, being good for a 
living thing and being good for an artifact, project, or activity. Nevertheless, in each of these 
cases, goodness implies the existence of an end (consciously desired or otherwise); goodness is 
necessarily teleological. As he argues in the Summa Theologica:  
“good” is predicated of many things not with meanings entirely different, as happens with 
things completely equivocal, but according to… the same proportion, in as much as all 
goods depend on the first principle of goodness, that is, as they are ordered to an end.194 
 
Thus, all goods bear a relation to an end, as do all predicables of the predicate “X is good for S.” 
B. Responding to Rosati by accommodating good-for predications 
 Let us return to Rosati’s challenge for singular analyses of relational good. For a singular 
analysis to satisfy Rosati, it must accommodate all right predications of “good for.” Rosati 
claims that there are at least five distinct good-for relations; she claims that these distinct 
relations cannot be reduced to a singular analysis. I disagree.  
 Rosati lists the following five (purportedly distinct) good-for relations; she also provides 
an example of each relation for clarity:  
1.Instrumental Good-For: Arsenic is good for poisoning. 
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2.Good for a Use Value: Oil is good for a car. 
3.Good for an Intrinsic Value: Controlled climates are good for valuable paintings.  
4.Good for a Living Thing: Nutrient-rich soil is good for a philodendron. 
5.Good for a Welfare Subject: Authentic happiness is good for a person. 
 
Rosati argues that, because these five good-for relations are irreducible to a single analysis, the 
phrase “good for” means something different in each case. For a singular analysis of relational 
good to succeed (at least, under Rosati’s argument), it must be able to accommodate each of 
these supposedly different good-for relations. Let us use our above analysis to work through each 
of these cases. 
1. Instrumental Good-For: “Arsenic is good for poisoning.” 
 
 As Rosati notes, much of our good-for language concerns instrumental goods—goods 
that act as means to achieving certain ends and purposes. Arsenic, we might say, is good for 
achieving the end of poisoning. But as we have seen, all instrumental goods are still ends—they 
are intermediate, relative ends. And the end being sought in this example is poisoning. Given this 
end, arsenic would be expedient for the completion, the fulfillment of the end. Note that this does 
not mean that poisoning is good in itself. Perhaps the poisoning ought not to be done (morally or 
otherwise). But this is irrelevant to our purposes. Furthermore, we need to admit nothing about 
whether that which is instrumentally good in this case is the most effective means—there are 
other better and worse ways to bring the act of poisoning to its completion (one could use 
cyanide, perhaps). Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that arsenic is a means to—and 
therefore an end relative to—the completion and fullness of the poisoning. We might further say 
that arsenic is good for an act of poisoning because arsenic is a means of its (i.e. the poisoning) 
becoming an attributively good act of poisoning (as far as poisonings go). Thus, the instrumental 
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goodness of arsenic (relative to an act of poisoning) can easily be accommodated by the 
Thomistic analysis.  
2. Good for a Use Value: “Oil is good for a car.” 
 
 In the arsenic example, the end towards which the instrumental good is directed was 
explicit—it was immediately clear that the ultimate end (to which the arsenic was a relative end) 
was poisoning. In this case (“oil is good for a car”), the end relative to which the oil is 
instrumental is left implicit. A car, in itself, is not an end. But this poses no problem. The 
Thomist will simply ask: “what is the end—i.e. the final cause—of a car?” Because a car (as an 
artifact) has no intrinsic, natural formal cause, it has no intrinsic, natural final cause. 
Nonetheless, a car does have a specific form (imposed by its designer), and this form is 
ultimately aimed at a particular purpose. That is, the formal cause of the car is aimed at its final 
cause, which is (roughly) to provide a certain kind of ground transportation.195 
 With this in mind, we can see how oil is indeed good for a car. Given the car’s form (e.g. 
with the kind of engine it has, etc.), oil is instrumental in achieving the car’s final cause (i.e. 
providing transportation). Oil is a means to the achievement of this end. Oil is necessary and 
expedient in the realization of reliable transportation; a car with a broken engine (caused by lack 
of oil) will not maintain its ability to realize its end, or fulfill its final cause. Thus, oil is good for 
a car insofar as it is instrumental in realizing the car’s ultimate end.  
3. Good for an Intrinsic Value: “A controlled climate is good for a painting.” 
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 Rosati posits a third kind of good-for relation due to the fact that certain objects are 
intrinsically valuable.196 The end of the car in the previous example was (roughly) the 
performance of a particular function given to it by its designer; however, it is not immediately 
apparent that an intrinsically valuable object has a function. Take, for example, an intrinsically 
valuable painting—its value seems independent of any particular function or end imposed from 
without. How might the Thomist address this situation?  
 Without being much of an aesthetician, I think there are a few possible candidates for 
ends or final cause here. One possible final cause (i.e. “end”) of a painting—like practically 
everything else in existence—is the continuance of its own existence as the kind of thing it is.197 
With this understanding, we might see how a controlled climate is good for an oil painting; it is 
necessary or expedient to the realization of its end—the oil painting’s continued existence as the 
kind of thing it is (in a particular state, etc.). And Rosati admits this much when she writes:  
But whereas in the case of those artifacts that are use values the concern is to preserve the 
functioning of the object, in the case of intrinsic values, like works of art, the concern is 
to preserve the object in its condition as the valuable item it is.198 
 
And of course Rosati is exactly right. But my claim is that in both cases—despite the difference 
in what the final cause is (e.g. functioning vs. continued existence), both can be analyzed in 
terms of ends or final causes.  
 We could posit other possible ends as well—perhaps the end or final cause of an aesthetic 
creation (considered as such) is to display beauty; perhaps to participate in the form of the 
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Beautiful, etc. In any case, I presume that a theory of aesthetics could be offered such that we 
could describe the purpose—i.e. the end or final cause—of a work of art, even its value does not 
lie in any particular “function.” And none of this requires that paintings have ends in any 
conative sense; all that is required is that there be some final cause we can plausibly attribute to 
works of art as such. A controlled climate would be instrumentally good for the painting insofar 
as it is instrumental in realizing this end.  
4. Good for a Living Thing: “Rich soil is good for a philodendron.” 
 
 Unlike an artifact, a living thing does not receive its ultimate end or final cause from an 
external source or artificer. This is not to say that an animal or plant cannot be put to some use, 
but that such a use is not an intrinsic end of the organism. Nor do we tend to believe that its 
ultimate end or final cause is mere continued existence (though that might be a necessary 
component of any fully-articulated final cause). The term “flourishing” is often used when 
describing the final cause of a living thing; generally, life, growth, health, and reproductive 
success seem to be constitutive of (say) a philodendron’s good. As such, any of these constitutive 
goods would be intrinsically good for the philodendron. And anything that is necessary or 
expedient for the realization of these goods would therefore be instrumentally good for it. In 
Rosati’s case, rich soil—insofar as it is necessary or expedient for the realization of life, growth, 
health, or reproductive success—would be instrumentally good for the plant. Again, this is not to 
say that philodendrons actively seek out nutritious soil in order to consciously accomplish some 
task; rather, soil is good (and therefore desirable as a relative end) insofar as it brings about a 
further end (which we call flourishing) that is intrinsic to the philodendron’s nature.  
5. Good for a Welfare Subject: “Pleasure is good for a person.” 
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 Rosati argues that the good-for relation in the context of well-being is also a distinct 
species of relational good. But again here we can apply the same analysis. The idea is that a 
person’s constitutive good is his or her ultimate end. This is the standard Aristotelian line—that 
certain things have natural, inherent final causes. The ultimate final cause—the ultimate that-for-
the-sake-of-which things are done—is our telos, our ultimate end, which Aristotle identifies has 
happiness. Aristotle goes on to make the famous (or infamous) function argument—we can leave 
that aside for now. As a purely formal matter, what is intrinsically good for us is the realization 
of our constitutive, ultimate final cause (or final causes, if there be more than one) for us as 
humans. 
 This does not entail any Aristotelian substantive conclusion about the good. It could be 
that, given our nature as sensate beings, the experience of pleasure is our ultimate good. It could 
be that, given our nature as rational, volitional beings, the ends we choose for ourselves, or those 
things we value, when realized, constitute our intrinsic good. Or it could be that certain kinds of 
things categorically (and as an objective matter) constitute our good given the kinds of beings we 
are; e.g. knowledge, friendship, and the like. Any of these options remain open at this point. 
 And again, the same analysis can be applied for instrumental goods as well. Say that 
pleasure is the good. Surely money could be expedient for greater experience of pleasure 
(whether quantitatively or qualitatively). So if we say that money is good for a welfare subject, 
we are again saying that money is an end—a final cause—relative to the ultimate end of human 
life, which—as a substantive matter, for the sake of argument—is the experience of pleasure.  
 Everything that is good for a subject is so because it is an end, either ultimate or relative, 
of the subject itself. This goes for artifacts, seeing as they have an end imposed on them by their 
artificer or user, as well as living things, which have an end in the sense that they have an 
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ultimate good towards which they, by their very nature, are directed (often called “flourishing”). 
Of course, any end of an artifact is artificial, whereas the ends of living things are natural. 
Likewise (plausibly), the ultimate end of a rational, consciously volitional animal is different 
from that of an animal endowered with merely sensitive and nutritive powers. And we might, 
like Kraut, call both the ends of both human beings and animals “flourishing,” even though the 
substantive content of that flourishing would differ in the two cases, given that they are different 
kinds of organisms.  None of this suggests that the “good for” relation means different things in 
different cases. It seems that Rosati’s five kinds of good-for relations are not, in fact, irreducibly 
distinct. 
C. Responding to Behrends about Flourishing 
 We can then turn to the second objection raised against the singular analysis of relational 
good: that flourishing, contra Kraut’s thesis, does not always stand as the ultimate good in a 
good-for relation. Recall Behrends’ counterexample regarding the “terror machine,” the ultimate 
goal of which is to “promote unflourishing.” Given the above analysis of the good-for relation 
we can now see that this is merely a counterexample to the way Kraut phrased his analysis, and 
not an actual counterexample to the singular-analysis view itself. Flourishing is quite plausibly 
that which constitutes the ultimate good of many subjects, but it is not the ultimate good of 
artifacts, considered in themselves. Often, of course, the act of producing or using an artifact is 
ultimately undertaken for the sake of flourishing, but this is not necessary or essential. After all, 
as Behrends suggests, a mad scientist could very well wish to promote unflourishing and build a 
machine to accomplish his purposes. If the ultimate end of the terror machine is to promote 
unflourishing, and batteries are instrumental to the terror machine’s realization of this end, then 
of course batteries are good for the terror machine. In fact, the above analysis can simultaneously 
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affirm the importance of flourishing (for many subjects) while maintaining Behrends’ intuition 
that “something is good for an artifact if and only if, and because, it contributes to one of the 
functions of the artifact.”199  
 Contrary to Behrends’ worry, this does not entail that humans necessarily have 
“functions.”200 While I myself don’t share the worry (what is so odd about humans having 
“characteristic activities”?), we need not immediately go down this Aristotelian line of 
reasoning. The above analysis states that a welfare subject’s intrinsic good is his ultimate end—
whether or not we characterize that in terms of “function.” Thus, we may easily shift the 
discussion from a strange-sounding (to modern ears) substantive claim about the characteristic 
activity of humans to the conceptual claim about the ultimate end of human life. A singular 
analysis of the good needn’t entail any substantive Aristotelianism. 
 The upshot of all this is that artifacts and humans (and everything in between) can indeed 
be analyzed in the same way: X is good for S if X is an end of S, either instrumental or intrinsic. 
Kraut’s analysis, while quite insightful, has certain substantive notions (such as flourishing) built 
into the analysis that do not seem to apply to all good-for relations. I find it quite plausible that 
what is ultimately non-instrumentally good for organisms is their flourishing (considered in the 
substantive sense mentioned by Rosati); it is just that this is, after all, a substantive matter that 
should be argued for within our first-order discussions of value theory and ought not unduly 
influence the conceptual framework within which they are situated. By keeping the analysis on 
the conceptual level, and leaving talk of flourishing to the substantive level, we can see that a 
                                                 
 
199 See note 166. 
200 Behrends, "A New Argument for the Multiplicity of the Good-for Relation," 128. 
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formulation of a singular analysis is possible that does not run into the objections of Rosati and 
Behrends. 
D. Responding to Fletcher and Rosati on Normativity 
 There are two more concerns I wish to address here on the subject of normativity. First is 
a worry that Rosati raises—if that which is good for something is the realization of its ultimate 
end or final cause, and this end or final cause needn’t be actively desired or found valuable by 
that subject, then it seems that the above analysis is not sufficiently normative.201 That is, welfare 
is supposed to be reason-giving in a certain way. One might argue that the analysis above does 
not preserve the reason-giving nature of welfare, since it essentially identifies welfare with other 
non-reason-giving relations. For example: the fact that soil is good for trees does not somehow 
provide a tree with a reason to seek soil. If the “good-for” relation is the same regardless of its 
subject—e.g. trees and people, and the trees has no reason to seek its good, why should we? A 
few brief responses. First, the normative status—i.e. the extent to which welfare provides reason 
for action—is a matter of substantive debate. Philosophers can disagree about the reason-giving 
status of welfare (or of relational good in general) while still talking about the same concept. 
Because I here provide a conceptual analysis, it doesn’t seem that worries about normativity are 
immediately relevant. 
 Rosati’s concern appears to stem from the purported importance of internalism about a 
person’s good, which is the view that for something to be good for someone’s well-being, that 
person must be capable of caring about that good in some way. The goods of well-being, 
                                                 
 
201 Rosati, "Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem," 218. 
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therefore, provide pro tanto reasons for action insofar as they (have the capacity to) produce an 
“internal resonance” with the agent.202 But if there is a singular good-for relation that applies to 
non-reason-seeking agents (like animals) as well as non-sentient organisms (like plants) as well 
as nonliving things (like artifacts), then it is hard to see how well-being can be reason-giving in 
the way we typically take it to be. Since the singular analysis of relational good can be predicated 
of things that have no capacity for “internal resonances,” it seems that relational good cannot be 
reason-giving in the sense Rosati has in mind.  
 I don’t think that a worry on this front is merited. To assume that internalism is a necessary 
feature of well-being, we are eo ipso excluding certain accounts of objective-list theory and 
perfectionism from being candidates for the correct theory of human well-being. This would be a 
strange result; it places the truth or falsity of such welfare theories at the conceptual level, rather 
than the substantive. Presumably, we should attempt to discover the correct welfare theory through 
substantive debate, not through a conceptual analysis. And this is the point—if internalism is true, 
it is not true because the nature of the concept “well-being” or “good for” demands it. Why should 
the truth of internalism not rest at the substantive level? I find it quite plausible that something 
resembling internalism is part of how rational, volitional creatures like us discover what the good 
is. In fact, this is John Finnis’ interpretation of Aquinas’ epistemological approach to natural law: 
that we discover in what the human good consists by studying our natural inclinations—that what 
is good is that which does have in internal resonance with us.203 Internalism can fit within the 
                                                 
 
202 Ibid., 217, 27. 
203 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, 93. This, of course, does not exclude the 
possibility that our will or rationality might be distorted and make errors in judgment or action in 
our postlapsarian condition. 
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singular analysis, but it needn’t be central to it. Can we not simply say that considerations of well-
being are reason-giving to those beings that can act on such reasons? 
 Similarly, Fletcher’s worry about conflating attributive and relational goodness is 
misplaced. True, under the Thomistic analysis, what is intrinsically good for something (that has 
an intrinsic good) is the realization of its ultimate end, its final cause or “perfection.” This may 
seem to analytically entail welfare perfectionism, which many welfare theorists find implausible. 
But recall that the term “perfection” (or “final cause,” or “ultimate end,” or whatever word we use) 
has no substantive content built-in. The Thomistic analysis posits perfection as the constitutive 
good of something; but it is the job of the value theorist (perhaps a welfare theorist) to provide an 
account of what counts as perfection in a given case. Thus, while I have claimed that everything’s 
ultimate good is its final end and therefore its perfection, I have left the content of “perfection" 
wide open. Perhaps the ultimate good of a human being, his ultimate perfection, is the enjoyment 
of continuous pleasant experiences as hedonists argue; perhaps it is excellence in rational activity 
as Aristotelians often argue; perhaps it is contemplation of the divine mind as Thomists often 
argue; perhaps it is the satisfaction of certain desires as subjectivists often argue; perhaps it is 
enjoying numerous goods on some objective list as objective-list theorists argue; etc. The 
Thomistic analysis does not necessarily entail any substantive claims about what is or is not good 
for something; it merely provides a framework for understanding good-for claims.  
IV. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, it seems that many philosophers have discarded the possibility of a 
singular analysis too quickly. The above analysis has accommodated all of Rosati’s numerous 
kinds of relational good, and it has not fallen victim to the criticisms of Fletcher and Behrends. 
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We need not posit different kinds of relations when we say that “oil is good for cars” and 
“pleasure is good for humans.” According to Philippa Foot: 
The belief that the word ‘good’ must mean something different in the former and latter is, 
I think, simply a prejudice coming from the type of ethical theory that has dominated 
analytic philosophy in the past half-century.204  
 
A singular analysis can accommodate use of the “good-for” locution in a multiplicity of contexts; 
it provides unity and coherence to our language concerning relational good.  
 Now of course, one might argue that the above analysis is not helpful. It is content-
neutral, and adds little-to-nothing to our substantive debates concerning welfare and value theory 
more generally; if “to be good for S means to be an end for S” is an analytic truth, what progress 
have we made in our understanding of relational good? But in light of the very real possibility 
that many theorists writing about well-being are actually talking past each other for lack of a 
conceptual framework within which the meaning of “good for” is clear, I think that something 
like the above analysis would be rather helpful. In any case, I think that its content-neutrality is 
actually a strength for this approach. It places our discussions and arguments about the human 
good and personal welfare on solid ground and eliminates potential for conceptual confusion, so 
that our first-order substantive debates can be more fruitful. And with a singular analysis, 
perhaps such fruit will be more forthcoming. After all, we might know something about what it 
is to be good for a plant or an artifact—hopefully we can use that knowledge to better understand 
what it is for something to be good for us. 
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